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THE CONGRESSIONAL INVITATION TO AVOID
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING: AN ANALYSIS
OF SECTION 303 OF THE FEDERAL
MAGISTRATES ACT OF 1968t
Patricia W. Weinberg*

and

Robert L. Weinberg**

I. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES Ac:r

A

OF 1968

T the bill-signing ceremony for the new Federal Magistrates Act1

on October 17, 1968, President Johnson declared:

The Act that I will sign today achieves a long-overdue reform in
the Federal judicial system. It replaces the United States Commissioners with the office of the United States Magistrates.
But more than a name change is involved in this Act.... [I]t will
bring new standards of professionalism and a much higher quality
of justice to an important first level of our judiciary.
Later in his remarks he added, "The Act also improves the law relating to preliminary hearings of accused persons." 2 We take issue
only with the latter claim. For, ironically, this "reform" legislation,
which gives magistrates important new duties and insures that they
are better qualified to handle them, 8 also threatens to curtail the
performance of one of their most important former duties in safeguarding the accused: the holding of preliminary hearings under
rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4
The provision that assertedly "improves the law relating to
preliminary hearings" 5 appears in section 303(a) of the Act, as an

t Some of the research for this Article was undertaken in connection with the
current study of the preliminary hearing in four American jurisdictions (Chicago, Los
Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.) and in England by the Institute of
Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center. The research assistance to the Institute of law students, in particular Richard Wood and Lenore
Schreiber, has contributed to the materials for this Article. The authors' views are
their own, however, and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute.
• Member of the District of Columbia and Connecticut bars; Senior Research Attorney and Project Director of Preliminary Hearing Study, Institute of Criminal Law
and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. 1956, London School of Economics; LL.B. 1960, Yale University.-Ed.
•• Member of the District of Columbia and Connecticut bars; visiting lecturer
in criminal procedure, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1960,
Yale University; Ph.D. 1960, London School of Economics.-Ed.
1. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified in 18, 28 U.S.C.).
2. Remarks of the President upon signing S. 945, Federal Magistrates Act, Oct. 17,
1968 (Office of the White House Press Secretary).
3. See note 106 infra.
4. See note 8 infra.
5. Remarks of the President, supra note 2. The terms "preliminary examination"
and "preliminary hearing" are used interchangeably in this Article.
[ 1361]
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amendment to section 3060 of title 18 of the United States Code.
The amendment specifies that unless the preliminary hearing is
waived by the defendant or postponed with his consent it "shall
be held within a reasonable time following initial appearance" of
the accused before the magistrate, but no later than the tenth day
after the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody or the
twentieth day if the defendant has been released. 6 Prior to this
amendment, section 3060 was merely a cross-reference to rule 5
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 Rule 5 provides8
6. Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 303(a), 82 Stat. 1117 (1968):
Section 3060, title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"§ 3060. Preliminary examination
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a preliminary examination
shall be held within the time set by the judge or magistrate pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person has committed it.
"(b) The date for the preliminary examination shall be fixed by the judge or
magistrate at the initial appearance of the arrested person. Except as provided by
subsection (c) of this section, or unless the arrested person waives the preliminary
examination, such examination shall be held within a reasonable time following
initial appearance, but in any event not later than"(l) the tenth day following the date of the initial appearance of the arrested
person before such officer if the arrested person is held in custody without any
provision for release, or is held in custody for failure to meet the conditions of
release imposed, or is released from custody only during specified hours of the
day;.(~r the twentieth day following the date of the initial appearance if the
arrested person is released from custody under any condition other than a condition described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
"(c) With the consent of the arrested person, the date fixed by the judge or
magistrate for the preliminary examination may be a date later than that prescribed by subsection (b), or may be continued one or more times to a date subse•
quent to the date initially fixed therefor. In the absence of such consent of the
accused, the date fixed for the preliminary hearing may be a date later than that
prescribed by subsection (b), or may be continued to a date subsequent to the date
mitially fixed therefor, only upon the order of a judge of the appropriate United
States district court after a finding that extraordinary circumstances exist, and
that the delay of the preliminary hearing is indispensable to the interests of justice.
"(d) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, an arrested person
who has not been accorded the preliminary examination required by subsection
(a) within the period of time fixed by the judge or magistrate in compliance with
subsections (b) and (c), shall be discharged from custody or from the requirement
of bail or any other condition of release, without prejudice, however, to the institution of further criminal proceedings against him upon the charge upon which
he was arrested.
"(e) No preliminary examination in compliance with subsection (a) of this
section shall be required to be accorded an arrested person, nor shall such arrested
person be discharged from custody or from the requirement of bail or any other
condition of release pursuant to subsection (d), if at any time subsequent to the
initial appearance of such person before a judge or magistrate and prior to the
date fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) an
indictment is returned or, in appropriate cases, an information is filed against such
person in a court of the United States.
"(f) Proceedings before United States magistrates under this section shall be
taken down by a court reporter or recorded by suitable sound recording equip•
ment. A copy of the record of such proceeding shall be made available at the
expense of the United States to a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to
pay or give security therefor, and the expense of such copy shall be paid by the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts."
7. In its entirety, section 3060 had read: "§ 3060. Preliminary Examination-
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that a defendant arrested prior to indictment should be brought
before a committing magistrate, there informed of his rights, and
"within a reasonable time" afforded a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to detain him pending grand
jury consideration9 of his case.
If section 303 had simply prescribed the ten- and twenty-day
limits for nonconsensual continuances of the hearing date, it would
have added needed specificity to the "reasonable time" requirement
of rule 5(c). But section 303 goes on to provide that "[n]o preliminary examination : . . shall be required to be accorded an arrested
person ... if at any time subsequent to the initial appearance of
such person . . . and prior to the date fixed for the preliminary
examination ... an indictment is returned . . . ." 10 Instead of
"improv[ing] the law relating to preliminary hearings of accused
persons," this provision offers the well-organized prosecutor's office
an invitation to avoid a preliminary hearing altogether. Senator
(Rule) SEE FEDERAL Rur.Es OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Proceedings before commissioner,
appearance, advice as to right to counsel, bearing, Rule 5." Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 819.
8. Rule 5 reads:
(a) .APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COIIIMISSIONER. An officer making an arrest under a
warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest
available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person
arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a
complaint shall be filed forthwith.
(b) STATEMENT BY THE CoM?.nssroNER. The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his
right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is
unable to obtain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He
shall also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and
that any statement made by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall
allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall
admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules.
(c) PRELIMINARY ExAMINATION. The defendant shall not be called upon to plead.
If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith
hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The
defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in
his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in
the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The commissioner shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After concluding the proceeding the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of
the district court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him.
For a discussion of the effect of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 on rule 5, see
pt. III. C. infra.
9. If the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, or if he waives grand jury
indictment, grand jury consideration is not required and the prosecutor may instead
file an information. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
IO. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(e) (Supp. Feb. 1969). This section is quoted in note 6

supra.
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Tydings, the sponsor and architect of the Act, recognized this possibility, and predicted that "[t]he ultimate result in our busy urban
districts may be the virtual elimination of preliminary hearings, but
only if the present grand jury delays are eliminated first." 11
Under prior law, it is true, many federal prosecutors routinely
avoided preliminary hearings by securing continuances of the
hearing date until after an indictment was obtained.12 But this ploy
required a complaisant magistrate or an inert defendant. Moreover,
the propriety of using continuances to circumvent the accused's
right to a preliminary hearing had come under increasing and sometimes successful attack.13 Section 303, if literally construed, can
legitimize the prosecutorial practice of mooting the defendant's right
to a preliminary hearing under rule 5(c) by obtaining a relatively
quick indictment.14 This predictable use or abuse of the Act should
and can be prevented, we submit, either by a judicial construction
of section 303 that preserves the defendant's right to a prompt preliminary hearing,15 or by provision for alternative forms of discovery16 that would reduce the prosecutor's motivation for avoiding
the hearing.
11. Remarks on the floor of the Senate, Feb. 8, 1967, reprinted in Hearings on
S. J,475 b S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)
at 241 [hereinafter Hearings on S. J,475]. Compare the opinions on this point in two
staff memoranda prepared to accompany draft legislation. Staff Memorandum, April 28,
1966, in Hearings on S. J,475, at 9, 15: "[I]t is anticipated that preliminary hearings
will rarely be held." Staff Memorandum, June 7, 1966, Hearings on S. J,475, at 29, 86:
It is anticipated that this procedure will, at least initially, increase the frequency
of preliminary hearings in districts in which the gran,l jury backlog is such that no
action can be expected within a short time after arrest and presentment. It will
also provide something of an incentive for prompt grand jury action, in that a
prosecutor who wishes to avoid a preliminary hearing can do so only by getting
his case to the grand jury quickly.
12. See S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 371];
Remarks of Senator Tydings on the floor of the Senate, Feb. 8, 1967, in Hearings on
S. J,475, at 237, 241; Hearings on the United States Commissioner System Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14 (1965) (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lindquist of Temple University) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. I]; Hearings on the United
States Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., r,t. 3, at 220-22,
254-55 (1966) (testimony of Irving Younger of New York University and Judge Talbot
Smith of the Eastern Dist. of Michigan) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. 3].
13. See text accompanying note 71 infra.
14. See note 12 supra. The practice had been criticized in hearings on the legisla•
tion. Hearings, pt. I, at 14 (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lindquist); Hearings, pt. 3,
at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving Younger). As to indictment mooting the hearing,
see text accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 131-39 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 154-66 infra.
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FUNCTIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
UNDER PRIOR LAW

A. Historical Perspective
I. Early English and American Uses

Contemporary debate on the preliminary hearing has largely
focused upon whether the hearing's sole purpose is to determine the
existence of probable cause to hold the accused, or whether the
hearing has the additional purpose of affording the defendant an
opportunity for discovery. 17 Today either function is assumed to be
primarily for the defendant's benefit. The weight of judicial authority recognizes only the former purpose; as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in 1967, "[i]t is quite clear
from the logic as well as the history of the procedure that discovery
is not one of its purposes."18 The draftmen of the Federal Magistrates Act clearly shared this assumption: "Your committee believes
that a judicial determination of the question of probable cause for
the accused's restraint is the historic purpose of a preliminary examination, and that in light of certain current practices it is necessary
to spell out that purpose ...." 19
But in its origin, in sixteenth century English law, the preliminary hearing was designed primarily to serve the purpose of
discovery-and to do so for the benefit of the prosecution. The
first preliminary hearing statute,20 which was enacted in 1554, provided that nvo justices of the peace were to examine prisoners before
they were admitted to bail, to hear the testimony of those who
charged them, and to record the information thus disclosed. This
significant development in criminal procedure came about "apparently by accident, for the motive of the enactment was, it seems, to
prevent collusion between justices and criminals" in releasing
defendants on bail.21 A statute enacted in the following year ex17. See text accompanying notes 47-68 infra.
18. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
906 (1968). The court noted that "[t]here is extensive authority in the cases for the
proposition that the return of an indictment, which establishes probable cause,
eliminates the need for a preliminary examination." 385 F .2d at 133. It declined to
order a post-indictment preliminary hearing.
19. S. REP. No. 371, at 33. However, a committee staff memorandum noted the
other historical purposes of the preliminary hearing. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 268, 271.
20. l &: 2 Phil. &: M., c. 13 (1554).
21. T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 432 (5th ed, 1956); l
J. SrEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 219, 236-38 (1883). See also
M. DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 53 (1727 ed.):
[Under the prior practice, a single justice] did oftentimes by sinister Means set at
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tended the examination procedure to cases in which the prisoner was
not bailed but committed,22 and soon "it became apparent that an
important novelty had been introduced, albeit obliquely, into criminal procedure."23 Under the statute, "all arrested persons were to be
brought before the magistrate and to be examined by him. He would
then try to discover what evidence he could against the accused and
see to it that that evidence was not lost." 24 The preliminary examination thus came to serve a vital discovery function for the prosecution
at a time when there was neither a police force nor a public prosecutor.25
The magistrate's investigatory duties later began to decline,
about the same time as the first professional police force was established.26 The requirement that the accused be examined at preliminary hearing was finally abolished in England in 1848.27 By contrast
large great Offenders, such as were not bailable, and yet, to hide their Affection
therein, did signify the Cause of their Apprehension to be but only for Suspicion
of Felony, whereby the said Offenders have escaped unpunished; for Reformation
thereof, by the Statute 1 b 2 P. b M. it was enacted, That if it be for Manslaughter, or Felony, or Suspicion of Manslaughter, or Felony, (being bailable by
Law,) then the same Justices must be present together at the Time of the said
Bailment; and that they must certify (in Writing subscribed with their own Hands)
the said Bailment at the next General Gaol-delivery, to be holden within the
County where the Person shall be arrested or suspected, upon Pain to be fined by
the Justices of Gaol-delivery.
22. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555).
23. T. PLUCKNE'IT, supra note 21, at 432. The statutes are reprinted in A. KlRALFY,
A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH I.Aw 5-7 (1957).
24. E. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1953). For a historical
and analytical treatment of practices under the early legislation, I & 2 Phil. & M.,
c. 13 (1554), 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555), see 4 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISI'ORY OF EN•
GLISH I.Aw 528-30 (2d ed. 1937); 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 219-28. See also M.
DALTON, supra note 21, at 105-08, 539-48.
25. See E. PUTTKAJ\r:MER, supra note 24, at 88:
The statute [of Philip and Mary] was the reflection of the fact that at that time
(and indeed for close to another three hundred years) there was no organized
governmental agency faced with the task of prosecuting criminals. There was no
prosecuting attorney in England at that time, and, from the standpoint of the
preliminary examination even more significant, there was no police force. There
was literally no participation on the part of government in the criminal proceedings at this stage. This necessarily operated very largely to the benefit of
undeserving persons, because it might be possible to do away with incriminating
evidence, or the gathering of evidence might not begin until it was too late.
See also Devlin, The Police in a Changing Society, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 123, 125
(1966).
26. In England, this was in 1829. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 432. According
to Holdsworth,
as late as 1823 it was stated to the grand jury that, when a magistrate was
conducting this preliminary examination, he was acting inquisitorially and not
judicially; that such proceedings might and ought to be conducted in secret; and
that information so ascertained might be communicated to the prosecutor but not
to the party accused.
I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH I.Aw 296 (7th ed. 1956).
27. Sir John Jervis' Act, 11 & 12 Viet., c. 42 (1848). Shortly thereafter by the Act of
30 & 31 Viet., c. 35 (1867), the defendant was allowed to call witnesses at the prelimi-
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to the important role that discovery played in the early preliminary
examinations, the screening function was more limited than at
present. The rule as stated by Hale was: "If a person be brought
before a Justice, if it appears no Felony be committed, he may discharge him; but if a Felony be committed, though it appears not that
the party accused is guilty, yet he cannot discharge him, but must
commit or bail him." 28
The basic English preliminary examination statutes were in effect in this country both before and after the Revolution; 29 as in
England, the examination served the purpose of discovery for the
prosecution.80 But some states rejected or limited the English
preliminary examination statutes because of their incompatibility
with constitutional provisions securing the privilege against selfincrimination.31 As Justice Rutledge has pointed out:
nary hearing. For a discussion of the legislation, see 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 21, at
220-29. It seems likely that there was a shift in emphasis of the preliminary hearing
away from requiring the accused to make a statement even before the adoption of the
statute. See ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39, Commentary, at 266 (Official Draft
1930); P, DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 6-8 (1958); T. PLUCKNETI',
supra note 21, at 432; Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy
for the Third Degree, 30 MrcH. L. REY, 1224, 1233-35 (1932).
28. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98 (1682 ed.).
29. Kauper, supra note 27, at 1235-36. During the colonial period, the statutory as
well as the common law of England was generally in effect unless it conflicted with an
enactment of a colonial assembly. See Note, Law in Colonial New York: The Legal
System in 1691, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1757, 1769 (1967). The statutes of Philip and Mary
are cited as authority in numerous early legal treatises. See, e.g., BURN's .ABRIDGMENT,
OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 141 (1792); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, OR THE OFFICE, Durr, AND
AUTHORITY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 82 (1722); J. LATROBE, THE JUSTICE'S PRACTICE
UNDER THE LAws OF MARYLAND 317 (2d ed. 1835); G. WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY
OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 31, 140 (1736).
ll0. See J. GOEBEL &: T. NAUGHroN, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW You
630-llll (1944).
31. The privilege against self-incrimination had received early acceptance in this
country. See generally Rogge, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 862 (1969). It has been
nid that it "came to be fairly well established in the New England colonies before
1650 and in Virginia shortly thereafter." Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 781
(19ll5). By 1789 the privilege was included in the constitutions or bills of rights of
seven states. Id. at 764-65. State constitutional provisions, including the privilege
against self-incrimination, were generally cited in the early justice of the peace manuals. See J. CoLVIN, MAGISTRATE'S GUIDE AND CITIZEN'S COUNSELLOR 238 (1805) (citing
the Maryland provision that "no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against
himself"); H. POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 350 (1816)
[quoting N, C. CONST, art. VII (1776)]. Massachusetts adopted its own committal
statute as early as 1783. D. DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE AUTHORITY AND
DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 26 (1824). The author states
that the provisions of the statutes of Philip and Mary had not been adopted by the
state. Id. at 90-91. Even though a defendant might be called upon to plead under the
statute "[w]hen the party is brought before the magistrate, he ought to be cautioned,
that he is not bound either to accuse himself, or confess his guilt; and that any confession or admission of that. nature may be produced in evidence against him on his
trial." Id. at 107.
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Historically it was the preliminary inquisition which gave rise to
the privilege. It was won through centuries of struggle against abuses
of magisterial as well as more formal judicial inquisition. The
modern hearing is the lineal descendant of the ancient preliminary
examination. But its character has changed with the evolution of
the privilege and other constitutional guaranties.a2

The shift away from requiring the accused to testify at preliminary hearing was accompanied by increasing opportunities for the
defense to gain positive advantages at the hearing. Gradually the accused obtained the right to be present at the hearing and to be
accompanied by counsel,33 to cross-examine witnesses against him,34
In South Carolina, the statutes of Philip and Mary remained in effect until 1839,
when the legislature passed its own committal statute, indirectly repealing the English
predecessor. See In Te Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858); B. PRESSLEY,
THE LAW OF MAGISTRATES AND CoNsrABLES IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROUNA 208 (1848).
The new statute provided that the defendant need no longer be examined at the
preliminary hearing-a regrettable deviation from former practice, according to a
contemporary commentator:
Though by the Act of 1839, it is no longer obligatory on the magistrate to examine
the prisoner, yet it were better that this ancient and established course be pursued
as the hearing of what the prisoner may say for and against himself, will probably
furnish useful information in the investigation of the case.
Id. See also H. HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 98 (1822), emphasizing
that the English statutes of Philip and Mary are "not in force in this country, [and)
the trial of a criminal in this state must be governed by the rules of the common law,
and our own act of Assembly; neither of which will justify his own examination in
order to convict him." The magistrate was authorized "to take the voluntary information of the accused." Id. at 205 (emphasis added). The privilege against self-incrimination was contained in the first Alabama Constitution, art. 1, § 10 (1819).
Id. at 473.
32, Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (footnote omitted).
The court reversed the conviction because the accused's plea of guilty at the preliminary hearing had been admitted into evidence at trial, and noted that the right to
examine the defendant at preliminary hearing does not entail
authority to compel him to answer, with the sanction of contempt, or to do so
in any manner which would violate constitutional right • • • • The power of
examination, therefore, goes no further than is constitutionally permissible in a
judicial proceeding. Nor should the hearing be made a trap for luring the unwary
into confession or admission which is fatal or prejudicial. So to use it would
pervert its function and make of the court, not an arbiter, but an arm of the
prosecution. This could bring back the very evil the privilege was created to
destroy.
128 F.2d at 271.
33. See J. BENEDicr, BENEDICT'S TREATISE: CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE JURIS•
DICTION POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
278-79 (1846); T. WATERMAN, THE JUSTICE'S MANUAL; OR, A SUMMARY OF THE POWERS
AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK 206 (2d ed. 1825),
But see In Te Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858) ("While it was
professed to confront the accused and the witnesses, and allow the benefits of crossexamination, in practice the right of counsel for the accused to be present as a matter
of right was denied.').
There may have been mixed motives for allowing the defendant to be present. See
J. GOEBEL 8i: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 33-34: the right to confrontation at the
preliminary examination "probably developed during the early eighteenth century,
chiefly because it was a convenient way to wrest a confession from a prisoner,"
34. H. HrrCHcocK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 205 (1822). But the right to
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and to call witnesses in his own behalf.35 In comparison to the earlier
American practice,36 the screening standard became higher: the
accused was entitled to discharge unless it had been shown that there
was probable cause that he had committed the offense.37 By 1824 the
Solicitor General of Massachusetts was able to write that the preliminary examination "has been considered rather as a privilege in fa.
vour of the party accused, afforded by law for the benefit of an
innocent man, who may by this opportunity have it in his power to
cross-examination did not exist in colonial New York. J. GoEBEL &: T. NAUGHTON, supra
note 30, at 635.
35. J. BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 279; D. DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE
AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JusnCES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 112 (1824);
J. LATROBE, supra note 29, at 317; T. WATERMAN, supra note 33, at 205; G. WEBB, supra
note 29, at 112. J. GOEBEL&: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 633, without citing author•
ity, state that "[t]he justice's manuals usually contained an admonition that evidence
which went against the Crown should be taken as well as that which was against the
defendant,"
36. See BuRN's ABRIDGMENT, supra note 29, at 156:
If a felony is committed, and one is brought before a justice upon suspicion
thereof, and the justice finds upon examination that the prisoner is not guilty;
yet the justice shall not discharge him, but he must either be bailed or committed:
For it is not fit that a man once arrested and charged with felony, or suspicion
thereof, should be delivered upon any man's discretion, without further trial.
See also id. at 64-65, 98; H. HITCHCOCK, supra note 34, at 204; G. WEBB, supra note 29,
at 140. The language in each of the three treatises cited is almost identical.
37. See J. BENEDICT, BENEDICT'S TREATISE: CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE JURIS·
DICfION, POWERS AND DUTIES OF JusnCES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 471
(3d ed. 1852):
If, upon the examination of the whole matter, it appears to the magistrate either
that no offence has been committed by any person, or that there is no probable
cause for charging the prisoner therewith, he must discharge him.
It appears formerly to have been held, and upon high authority, that if there
were an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, the magistrate had
no discretion to discharge, but must bail or commit him. But this position has
been controverted by all recent authorities, and cannot be considered as the law
at the present day. For it has been well observed, that according to this doctrine,
the liberty and character of every man in the country would be placed at the
mercy, not of the magistrate, (for he is assumed to have no discretion,) but at
the mercy of any corrupt and infamous individual, who might think proper to
make a positive oath that a felony had been committed by the person whom he
accused-a doctrine too monstrous to be stated as law.
(The 1846 edition of this work, supra note 33, at 280, is in accord with the first paragraph of the above quotation but lacks the commentary contained in the second
paragraph.) Accord, T. WATERMAN, supra note 33, at 207; cf. D. DAVIS, supra note 35,
at 112; H. POTIER, THE OFFICE AND Durr OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 60 (1816) ("The
justice should discharge persons brought before him charged with any crime, if upon
inquiry it manifestly appears either that no crime was committed, or that the suspicion
entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless: otherwise he must be committed
to prison or give bail,"). See also J. LATROBE, supra note 29, at 317:
If there be an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, though his
guilt appear doubtful, the justice cannot wholly discharge him, but must bail or
commit him • • • • And, in modem practices, though exculpatory evidence is re•
ceived at the instance of the prisoner, and certified with the other depositions,
unless it appear in the clearest manner that the charge is malicious, as well as
groundless, it is not usual for the magistrate to discharge him, even when he
believes him to be altogether innocent.
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clear himself from suspicion. " 38 The same source also recognized the
possibility of using testimony taken at the preliminary hearing for
impeachment at trial39-a principal object of contemporary defense
counsel who use the preliminary hearing for discovery.40

2. Rule 5(c) Prior to the Magistrates Act
From 1789 until the adoption of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, the preliminary hearing in federal practice followed,
in large measure, the practice of the state in which the federal court
was sitting.41 The federal provision adopted as rule 5(c), which was
thought to reflect prevailing state practice,42 reads:
38. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 92. The same language, though different grammar,
is to be found in J. BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 469, where it is added: "And it being
for the benefit of the accused, he has a right to insist upon an examination taking
place, before he can be compelled to enter into a recognizance."
39. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 94:
In Massachusetts, it is not the usual practice to take the testimony of the com•
plainant and witnesses in writing. It is sometimes done in capital cases, and in
other cases in which a particular interest is taken or existed; but such written
testimony is not made use of on the trial unless by the consent of the prisoner;
though it undoubtedly may be, to contradict or impeach the testimony of a witness
when material varies, or is repugnant to what he swore to before the magistrate.
J. GOEBEL&: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 636, cite "one important case [in which] it
had been ruled that examinations could be read at the defendant's request to impeach
the credibility of a witness." The preliminary hearing's change from a discovery tool
for the prosecution to a discovery tool for the defense is explained clearly and accu•
rately, though with little documentation, in E. PUITKAMMER, supra note 24, at 88-95.
40. See E. BARRETI PRETIYMAN FELLOWS, 1965-1966, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 7-8 (1967) (footnote omitted):
There is currently a judicial dispute as to whether discovery is another recognized
purpose of a preliminary hearing. From the perspective of the defense counsel,
however, there is no doubt that the hearing is a critical tool in trial preparation.
If used properly, the crucial facts of the government's case, including names of
potential witnesses, statements made by the defendant, and physical evidence in
the government's possession, can be discovered. Moreover, since the hearing is
transcribed or recorded, the testimony is preserved for potential trial use in refreshing recollection or impeachment. For these reasons, preliminary hearings
SHOULD NEVER BE WAIVED.
41. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 91 (emphasis added) provided:
That for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may, by any
justice or judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other
magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found agre, !.bly to the
usual mode of process against offenders in such state • • • be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed as the case may be, for trial • • . .
By this directive, preliminary proceedings in federal criminal cases were to be governed
by the law of the state in which the court was sitting. See In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015,
1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858):
In the United States there is no law by which an established mode of criminal
procedure is provided, and an uniform system of practice pursued. In the criminal
as in the civil administration of justice, legislation, as far as it has gone, has
professed to assimilate in each state the practice of the courts of the United States
with that of the highest courts of law in that state.
See also United States v. Horton, 26 F. Cas. 375 (No. 15,393) (C.C. Mo. 1873), and the
discussion and authorities in L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES 228-30 (1966). Orfield concludes that "the great bulk of the cases held that state
law was applicable to almost every aspect of the preliminary examination in the federal
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The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the defendant
waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith
hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not
waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within
a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses
against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from
the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold
him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall
discharge him ....

Rule 5(c) is silent as to the nature and strength of the evidence.
needed to establish probable cause. And, although the rules elsewhere provide that the defendant may waive indictment,43 they fail
to indicate whether a defendant who is within the ambit of rule
5(c) 44 can be deprived of the hearing by return of an indictment
before the hearing is held.
The practical result under rule 5(c), as the draftsmen of the new
Magistrates Act found, was that "[£Jew commissioners have any clear
idea of what the contours and purposes of the preliminary hearing
are. Much of this confusion is pardonable, since the law with respect
to the preliminary hearing is in dire need of clarification." 45 In
adopting the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress did at least clarify
courts prior to the adoption of Rule 5," although he cites a few cases to the contrary.
Id. at 231 nn. 1, 2, 6.
Later federal statutes, e.g., Act to Suppliment the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
5 Stat. 516 (1842), Appropriations Act, 29 Stat. 184 (1896), provided for the
appointment of federal committing magistrates, but the obligation to follow state
procedure remained. It was not until 1940 that legislation was approved authorizing
the Supreme Court to regulate criminal procedure in the federal courts. 54 Stat. 688,
now 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964). The rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court at
the end of 1944 and took effect on March 21, 1946. Holtzoff, A Criminal Case in the
Federal Courts, in 1966 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (West ed.). Rule 5
has been said to be "largely a codification of pre-existing practice, except that it
eliminates pleas before committing magistrates, which were in fact an anomaly." Id.
at 5. For a discussion of early drafts of rule 5, see L. ORFIELD, supra, at 203-15. The
best compilation of state law governing the preliminary hearing prior to the adoption
of rule 5 is contained in ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 39-60, Commentary,
at 266-334 (Official Draft 1930).
42. F.ED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), Advisory Committee Note 2. For a discussion of the effect
of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 on rule 5, see pt. III. C. infra.
43. F.ED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
44. Rule 5(c) applies only to a defendant who has been arrested or summoned
prior to the return of an indictment. See United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798, 799
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
do not set forth the circumstances under which an accused may be arrested without
warrant; that is left to statute and case law. But rule 5 expressly applies to a defendant arrested with or without warrant.
45. S. REP. No. 371, at IO; H. REP. No. 1,629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [hereinafter H. REP. No. 1,629].
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the law by specifying the purpose of the preliminary hearing: the
legislative history of amended section 3060 makes clear that the
only purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine probable
cause, and that discovery is no longer, if it ever was, a purpose of
the hearing.46
B. Theoretical Screening and Discovery Functions
of the Preliminary Hearing
In contemporary judicial thinking, it is generally accepted that
the task of screening out weak or unsupported charges and discharging the defendant if the committing magistrate finds no
probable cause to believe that he is guilty is a proper function of the
preliminary hearing.47 The only doubts on this point have been
whether the preliminary hearing is effective in carrying out this
function, 48 and what significance the decision at preliminary hearing
should have in federal and other jurisdictions in which the prosecutor is allowed to ignore the magistrate's ruling and to seek an original indictment on the same charge.49
46. S. REP. No. 371, at 34-35.
47. See United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1968); Sciortino v.
Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); United States v.
Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 467 (4th Cir. 1967); Boone v. United States, 280 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.
1960); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM .ARREsr TO APPEAL 67-68 (1947); Note,
The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164, 165, 167•68
(1965); Note, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due Process, 15 KAN. L. REv.
374, 375 (1967).
Determination of probable cause was the purpose of the preliminary hearing most
frequently cited by United States Commissioners responding l:o a questionnaire sent to
them by the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery. See Hearings on
S. 3,475, at 487. The Subcommittee sent a detailed questionnaire to each of the more
than 730 commissioners and received in reply 407 substantially completed responses.
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 453. The staff drew on this material to prepare a unique
picture of the way in which commissioners view their role and functions. The report is
printed as Appendix. I, Report by Subcomm. Staff on U.S. Commissioner Responses
to Subcomm. Questionnaire, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 453-97 [hereinafter Questionnaire].
48. Serious criticism has been leveled at magistrates' ability and qualifications to
conduct the preliminary hearing and other judicial duties. See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM .ARREsr TO APPEAL 75 (1947); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE•
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 34-36 (1967),
Two commissioners raised the issue with the Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery in response to a question as to whether the preliminary hearing
is well designed to achieve its goals:
"Preliminary hearings, left to Commissioners, are very summary. The worth depends on individuals. This is the reason more thought should be given to appointment."
"If the office of Commissioner is competently discharged, I think it adequately
serves its purpose. However, I personally know of U.S. Commissioners who were
appointed because of their personal connections with a Federal Judg.,, and who
have no other qualifications."
Questionnaire 490-91.
49. Questionnaire 491, stated that "[s]ome commissioners were critical of the
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Rule 5(c), like its state counterparts, makes no express reference
to affording the defendant discovery. But some degree of discovery
is an inevitable result of an adversary hearing in which probable
cause is established through the testimony of witnesses. The desire
of prosecutors to avoid the discovery function of the preliminary
hearing, rather than their desire to avoid the screening function, has
given rise to the widespread practice of continuing the preliminary
hearing date until the return of an indictment renders a hearing
moot. 50 By the same token, it is defense counsels' desire to use
the hearing as a means of obtaining discovery-a means not available under any other rule51-that has led them to challenge this
practice and other restrictions on the opportunity to use preliminary
hearings as a discovery device. 52 These challenges have yielded a
body of recent case law on the subject of whether discovery is a
legitimate function of a rule 5(c) preliminary hearing.
Against the backdrop of these cases, and particularly the decisions in the District of Columbia, the draftsmen of the Federal
Magistrates Act fashioned section 303.53 In so doing they chose to
fact that the government may seek an indictment from the grand jury regardless of
whether the case had been heard by the commissioner, and regardless of his decision
on probable cause if it was heard ••••" The staff report quotes from two commis•
sioners who
mentioned cases in which they had found no probable cause after which indict·
ments had been obtained but without successful prosecution.
"One year I dismissed six cases after which the Grand Jury indicted and, on
trial in U.S. Court, all thereof were acquitted."
" ••• I have discharged defendants, and the U.S. Attorney subsequently indicts
them; in several cases, the Judge turned them loose again."
Id.
50. The possibility of saving time for prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and
other witnesses by avoiding the preliminary hearing is an additional justification for
the practice.
In general, United States Attorneys have had free rein to avoid the preliminary
hearing. Answers by two United States Commissioners to a Subcommittee question as
to why preliminary hearings were not held were particularly disturbing: "When ap•
pointed I was instructed by U.S. District Attorney to set hearings far enough in
advance to allow for grand jury indictment." "It is the policy of the U.S. Attorney not
to have preliminary hearings." Questionnaire 483 (emphasis added); cf. note 12 supra.
51. None of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the cross•
examination under oath of potential government witnesses before trial in order to
obtain discovery of their testimony. Under rule 15(a), the court may, after indictment,
allow the defendant to take the deposition of "a prospective witness [who] may be
unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing" if his testimony is
material and a deposition is necessary "to prevent a failure of justice." But this pro•
vision was not intended as a discovery device and has not been used as such. See 8
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 15.02, at 15-4 (R. Cipes, 2d ed. 1968). Rule 16 covers
only the discovery and inspection of written material and tangible objects. For a dis•
cussion of the inadequacy of federal discovery procedures, see generally Comment,
Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia-An Emerging Discovery Device, 56
Gro. L.J. 191, 203-05 (1967).
52. See note 40 supra.
53. In a memorandum on the preliminary hearing prepared for use of the Sub-
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follow the weight of authority and reject the discovery function of
the preliminary hearing. 54 Before criticizing this choice, it will be
helpful to review the judicial precedent on the subject. Like the
Committee, we will take special note of the case law that has developed in the District of Columbia, since it has differed markedly from
practice in other parts of the federal judicial system.
C. Case Law on the Functions of the

Preliminary Hearing
Although all of the participants in a preliminary hearing are well
aware that discovery is a significant outcome of the proceedings, most
courts have refused to recognize discovery as a valid purpose of the
hearing. Instead, the courts have generally declared that screening
cases for grand jury action is the sole valid purpose; the reported decisions indicate that only rarely have courts thwarted the prosecutor's
inclination to moot the hearing by seeking a continuance pending
indictment. But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit took a major step in curbing this practice in 1961 55 when an
appellant alleged that postponement of his hearing pending indictment was "representative of a general philosophy or pattern." 56
The court emphatically declared that "persons accused of crime are
entitled to prompt preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 5." 57
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, its staff paid particular attention
to the law in the District of Columbia. See Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. J,475,
at 265. See also Staff Memorandum, id. at 273, 274: "In the District of Columbia,
the Court of Appeals for the first time is beginning to lay down standards for the
proper conduct of a preliminary hearing • . • ."
54. Hearings on S. J,475, at 2-3 (remarks of Senator Tydings):
The subcommittee's previous hearings on the commissioner system have disclosed
that a great deal of confusion exists about the procedures and purpose of the
preliminary hearing. Indeed, any study of the common law background of the
preliminary hearing, and of the cases which have been handed down since this
Nation's formation will indicate that there is a great deal of cloudiness and confusion about the range and purpose of preliminary hearings. The bill accepts the
traditional notion that the hearing is solely a device for the determination of
probable cause • • • •
The preliminary hearing provision of the bill operates on the assumption that
the problem of pretrial discovery should be treated separately and apart from the
preliminary hearing.
55. Drew v. Beard, 290 F.2d 741.
56. 290 F.2d at 741.
57. 290 F.2d at 742. The committing magistrate had postponed the hearing on the
ground that the defendant was on bond, a ground disapproved by the court of appeals:
"The fact that an accused is at liberty on bond does not in itself constitute a reason
for denying him a prompt preliminary hearing, or postponing the hearing to a future
date." 290 F.2d at 742. The language is dictum; the appeal was dismissed as moot
because the preliminary hearing had been scheduled for the same day as the appeal
was decided. However, the dictum had an important practical impact in reducing the
practice of bypassing preliminary hearings in the District of Columbia. See also Wilson
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Three years later, in Blue v. United States} 8 the same court analyzed the purposes of the hearing and found discovery to be one of
them:
It has generally been thought that the purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to afford the accused (1) an opportunity to establish that
there is no probable cause for his continued detention and thereby
to regain his liberty and, possibly, escape prosecution, and (2) a
chance to learn in advance of trial the foundations of the charge
and the evidence that will comprise the government's case against
him.119

Recognition of discovery as an independently valid purpose of
the preliminary hearing proved to be a remarkably controversial
statement-and one from which the court has recently retreated.
After several decisions following Blue's recognition of the discovery
function of the preliminary hearing, 00 in Ross v. Sirica61 the court
had to decide whether to review en bane a panel decision ordering
the reopening of a preliminary hearing so that additional witnesses
might be subpoenaed. The petition for en bane rehearing was
denied over the vigorous dissent of three judges, who felt that the
panel decision necessarily depended upon an erroneous belief that
discovery was a valid purpose of the preliminary hearing. 62 But
the opinion which, because of the balance on the court, proved to
be decisive was that of the two "swing" judges who voted to deny
rehearing en bane on the ground that the witnesses should have
v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which the preliminary hearing was
continued until the proceedings were dismissed as moot following indictment. Judge
Bazelon (dissenting from an order of the court denying leave to appeal in forma
pauperis from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus) stated that "the question how
to vindicate this critical right [to confront witnesses in a preliminary hearing and to
refute probable cause] is not frivolous and requires power over the processes of
criminal justice." 335 F.2d at 691.
58. 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
59. 342 F.2d at 901 (footnote, citing no case authority, omitted).
60. E.g., Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Holmes v. United
States, 370 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). For a comprehensive treatment of recent District of Columbia case law
on the subject, see Comment, supra note 51, at 194-202. See also The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 1961-65 Term, 54 GEO. L.J.
185, 203-09 (1965).
61. 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
62. Judge Danaher pointed out that "there is now and ••• for the last few years
there has been substantial disagreement among the judges of this court on the matter
of 'discovery' in preliminary hearings." 380 F.2d at 566. In a separate opinion, Judge
Burger, with whom Judge Tamm joined, said that "[i]t should be clear ••• that a
majority of the Court does not agree with the three judges of the sitting division in
their effort to re-write the procedure authorized by Congress for a preliminary hearing
so as to convert it into a discovery mechanism." 380 F.2d at 569. A fourth judge, without intimating a position on the merits, would have granted rehearing to clarify
uncertainties as to the proper function of the preliminary hearing. 380 F.2d at 569.
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been subpoenaed for the purpose of resolving the issue of probable
cause. In reaching their conclusion they restated the relationship
of discovery to the preliminary hearing:
The focus of the solicitude embodied in the procedural device of the
preliminary hearing is the liberty of the accused. Should it be taken
away from him because there is probable cause to believe that he has
committed a crime for which the grand jury will indict? To the
extent that the prosecution is put to its proof of such probable
cause, the accused in effect gets discovery of that much of the
Government's case as is comprised of the evidence it adduces to
establish probable cause. But that is an inevitable consequence of
the hearing, and not its primary purpose.63

This limitation upon Blue's recognition of discovery as an independently valid purpose of the hearing is particularly significant since
it was ·written by the author of the Blue opinion. 64
Decisions in other circuits have not accepted discovery as a purpose of the preliminary hearing. For them, the sole rationale of the
preliminary hearing is to inquire whether there is probable cause to
hold the defendant pending action by the grand jury. 65 On this
premise, the' federal courts generally have not hesitated to rule that
the defendant's right to the hearing is mooted when an indictment
is returned prior to the date set for a preliminary hearing: since the
only purpose of the hearing is to decide whether the defendant
should be held for the grand jury, there is no longer any purpose to
be served by a hearing after the grand jury has acted. 66 Some courts
have also pointed out that the provisions of rule 5 do not apply to a
defendant who is arrested under rule 9 following an original indictment, 67 and that there is no rule under which such a defendant may
be given a preliminary hearing. 68 Therefore, the courts reason, once
the grand jury has acted, a defendant who was arrested either by
warrant under rule 4 or without warrant should be in the same
68. 380 F.2d at 563 (statement of Judges McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons
for voting to deny rehearing en bane).
64. Judge McGowan, as the author of Blue, was at liberty to comment: "It may
well be that there is language in the Blue opinion which obscures this true relation•
ship of discovery to probable cause. But, however cloudy or misconceived that language
may be, the relationship, as it is given to us to understand it, is as described above."
380 F .2d at 563.
65. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
66. See cases cited in note 47 supra. See also United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 88
(2d Cir. 1968).
67. Swingle v. United States, 389 F.2d 220, 223 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 928 (1968); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
68. A challenge to this disparity on equal protection grounds failed to obtain
certiorari. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Swingle v. United States, 389 F.2d 220 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
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position with respect to the hearing as a defendant who was arrested
under rule 9.
It is no coincidence that the few courts which hold that a preliminary hearing is not automatically mooted by indictment are
those which have recognized the value of the preliminary hearing
in affording discovery to the defense. But for some reason the decisions holding that indictment does not moot the hearing have not
been premised on a need to afford discovery. In Blue, which shattered precedent by holding that an indictment would not invariably
moot the preliminary hearing, 69 the District of Columbia Circuit
considered the possible effect of a post-indictment finding of no probable cause:
In a preliminary hearing held or reopened after indictment, the
Commissioner would continue under the necessity of making his
own independent determination of probable cause. If he were persuaded that no such cause existed, that finding would result in his
release of the defendant. It would not affect the indictment, although
the Commissioner's action would presumably cause the prosecutor
to review the indictment again with care. The defendant could be
made to respond to the indictment by summons, or a resumption of
custody could be sought by application for a bench warrant. In
the latter case, such a singular circumstance as a finding of no
probable cause by the Commissioner would presumably be a factor
for consideration by the court.70
This explanation, though technically impeccable, reveals the practical anomaly of requiring the commissioner to hold a probable
cause hearing after the ultimate decision on probable cause has already been reached by a grand jury. A preliminary hearing after
indictment realistically serves a useful function only in terms of
discovery. Nevertheless, the "swing" judges in Ross v. Sirica, who
69. The precedent-breaking language stated, inter alia:
We do not believe ••• that the mere existence of an indictment renders academic
any defects in the Commissioner's proceedings or necessarily insulates those defects
from judicial correction.
• • • Where a defendant is denied out of hand the opportunity to consider
utilizing that value, we do not think that that denial is to be swept under the rug
of a grand jury indictment. Neither do we think that the availability of a remedy
should depend upon the outcome of a race between counsel seeking habeas corpus
or mandamus and the grand jury acting upon the charge. We, therefore, conclude
that relief in such a situation is not to be foreclosed solely by reason of an intervening indictment.
!142 F.2d at 899-900. In the case before it, however, the court declined to reverse the
conviction on the grounds that the issue had not been timely raised and that the defendant had not been prf judiced: "[W]e cannot find that the Commissioner's failure
to accord appellant a meaningful opportunity to elect a preliminary hearing, and
thereby to acquaint himself in greater detail with the case against him, so handicapped
him in his first trial as to require a second." 342 F.2d at 901.
70. 342 F .2d at 900 n.7.
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sought to minimize the discovery function of the preliminary hearing, indicated their unwillingness to retreat from the position that
indictment does not automatically moot the hearing. They castigated
the practice, found to exist in another jurisdiction, by which
preliminary hearings are avoided through continuances granted
routinely until mooted by an indictment. I£ such a practice were
attempted in the District, we would find no insuperable barrier in
meeting the problem through the sanction of requiring a hearing
after indictment. Similarly, we see no jurisdictional barrier to a like
sanction for coping with the withholding of critical witnesses whose
testimony is the key to the issue of the reasonableness of continued
detention. 71
The Supreme Court has been asked to resolve this conflict between
the District of Columbia72 and the other circuits,73 but thus far it
has declined. 74

III.

CRITICISM OF THE NEW LEGISLATION

Against this background of conflicting judicial opinion regarding
the purposes of the preliminary hearing and its relationship to grand
71. 380 F.2d at 563-64 (statement of Judges McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane) (footnote omitted).
72. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d
75 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 944 (1965).
73. See cases cited in note 47 supra. For commentary on mootness and rule 5(c),
see Note, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule
Change, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1416, 1420-26 (1968). In United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), Judge Weinstein noted that "[m]ost
courts have felt compelled to deny relief [when the government has delayed the hearing pending indictment] on the ground that the issue of delay was mooted by
indictment." In this case, in which the defendants had not yet been indicted, he
ordered their release from custody unless a preliminary hearing was held later the
same day. Moreover, he noted, "[a]t the insistence of the defendant, the preliminary
hearing of a defendant brought before a Commissioner prior to indictment should
take place before, or simultaneously with, presentment to the Grand Jury unless, of
course, the Grand Jury is operating independently of the United States Attorney-a
circumstance most rare.'' 269 F. Supp. at 198.
74. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). In Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965),
the Supreme Court had said in dictum:
[W]e think that the Government must proceed through the further steps of the
complaint procedure by affording the defendant a preliminary hearing as required
by Rule 5, unless before the preliminary hearing is held, the grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by returning an indictment.
In the Sirica case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded:
]aben does not undermine the holding in Blue that an accused who demands the
preliminary hearing as is his right is entitled to such a hearing and that, if the
point is properly and timely pressed, a denial of that hearing cannot be excused
by pointing to an intervening grand jury indictment.
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (footnote, noting that the issue had
not been properly raised in the Jaben case, omitted).
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jury action, the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery undertook a detailed study of the United States Commissioner system. Chaired by Senator Tydings, this subcommittee held
extensive hearings over a three-year period, first on the existing law
and practices and later on preliminary drafts of the Federal Magistrates Act. 75 The Act was the subject of more thorough, scholarly
consideration than most legislation receives. 76
But the adequacy of the congressional appraisal of section 303
in the broader context of federal pretrial criminal procedure is open
to question. Our criticism of the congressional decision concerning
the preliminary hearing, as embodied in section 303, 77 is twofold:
first, it reflects inadequate appreciation of the hearing's potential
ability to screen out weak cases, and second, it undermines use of
the hearing for discovery while failing to provide any substitute.
A. The Congressional Approach to the Screening

Function of the Hearing
Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act, which provides that
a preliminary hearing "shall not be required" after indictment, rests
upon a fallacious assumption that a grand jury's consideration of
whether or not to return an indictment is equivalent to a preliminary hearing as a screening device. The Senate report on the bill
contains the unexceptionable statement that "[n]o citizen should
75. Hearings, pt. 1; Hearings on the United States Commissioner System Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. 2); Hearings,
pt. 3; Hearings on S. !J,475.
By contrast, the two days of hearings in the House appear to have been conducted
almost pro forma. See Hearings on S. 945, H.R.. 5,502, H.R.. 8,277, H.R. 8,520,
H.R. 8,932, H.R.. 9,970, and H.R.. 10,841 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17 (1968) [hereinafter House Hearings on
S. 945]. The most extensive testimony was that of Senator Tydings, id. at 68-96, and
William T. Finley, Jr., former Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, id. at 119-42. The House amended the legislation
passed by the Senate but "most of the changes are designed either to clarify the act,
to resolve possible inconsistencies between the act and other statutes, or to make
grammatical improvements." H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 10. A comparison of House and
Senate (S. REP. No. 371) committee reports shows that the House Report is based in
large part on that of the Senate.
76. The legislative history, note 75 supra, shows an earnest attempt to fulfill Senator
Tydings' opening promise:
This is a hearing which we hope will mark the beginning of an extensive and
exhaustive examination of the U.S. commissioner system. We intend to find out
all there is to know about the current operation of the commissioner system, and
to seek the best available advice from the bench, the bar and the commissioners
themselves, of course, the persons who know most about this subject, in order to
determine what reforms are needed in this long-neglected "front line" area of
Federal justice.
Hearings, pt. 1, at I.
77. See note 6 supra.
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have his liberty restrained, even to the limited extent of being required to post bail or meet other conditions of release, unless some
independent judicial determination has been made that the restraint
is justified.''78 But the report proceeds on the erroneous premise that
"the magistrate, some judicial officer, [and] the grand jury" are all
capable, and equally so, of making an "independent judicial determination" that "restraint is justified.''79
The grand jury is not a proper body to reach an "independent
judicial determination" of probable cause. Its determination is
unlikely to be "judicial" because it is composed of laymen, so whose
sole guidance on legal questions will normally come from the prosecutor. Its determination is also unlikely to be "independent" in
most cases because, in practice, the prosecutor's influence is usually
controlling. In his classic 1932 study of preliminary criminal proceedings in Oregon, Wayne Morse observed that "studies of the
grand jury show rather conclusively that it is not inclined to be an
independent body but rather that it tends to stamp with approval,
and often uncritically, the wishes of the prosecuting attorney.''81
More recent studies support this conclusion; 82 as the Second Circuit
has stated, "[b]asically the grand jury is a law enforcement agency.''83
78. S. REP. No. 371, at 34 (emphasis added).
79. Id. See also Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 14, quoted in note 99
infra.
80. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956): "[l]n this country as in
England of old the grand jury has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical
rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no
one because of special favor."
81. Morse &: Beattie, Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Oregon,
11 ORE. L. R.Ev. 108-09 (Supp.) (1932); Morse, Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10
ORE. L. R.Ev. 101, 295 (1931); accord, Moley, Grand Jury, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF nIE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 148, 149 (1937) (volume 7 appears in volume 4 of the 1937 reissued ed.).
82. E.g., Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1967);
cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1171 (1960).
Recently a grand jury at the end of its five-month term issued a report suggesting
that the grand jury be abolished. The grand jury posed the following rhetorical
questions: "Isn't the grand jury simply rubber-stamping what a trial judge has previ•
ously decided? ••• Are not we but furthering the time element between arrest and
trial? • • . True (the grand jury) is a fine means of practice for the State's Attorney's
office and its witnesses. But is that enough to justify a grand jury?" Washington Post,
Feb. 6, 1969, at E6.
83. United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936
(1959). The court there said:
Under the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 and for several centuries thereafter the sole
function of the accusatory jury in the area of criminal law was to assist the Crown
in law enforcement •••• And today, with its power to subpoena witnesses and
question them in secret, the grand jury continues to be an important investigative
instrument of the prosecutor.
265 F.2d at 461 (citations omitted). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp.
283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933): "The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection
which it gives to the accused, justifies its survival as an institution."
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In practice, the federal criminal justice system has relied primarily on the discretion of prosecutors, and not on preliminary hearings84 or independent grand jury decisions, to screen out weak cases.
The prosecutor does not ordinarily want to take weak cases to trial
and will ask leave of court85 to drop charges when, on reflection,
evidence does not appear to warrant prosecution of a person already
charged. But prosecutorial "reflection" may take an unreasonably
long time. A committing magistrate, formerly an Assistant United
States Attorney, noted that the value of the preliminary hearing
lies less in the screening given by the hearing itself than in the
effect which its pendency has on the prosecutor:
It forces him ... to immediately screen his case. In other words, he
doesn't let [the defendant] sit in jail for three months and then
talk to the officer and dump it. It forces him to paper as we say....
[A] lot of [cases] are thrown out that wouldn't be thrown out if
the prosecutor wasn't, out of his busy schedule, forced to look at
the facts, forced to determine whether there's a case ••..86

Moreover, the prosecutor has to take account of factors other
than the possibility of winning a particular case. He must also make
policy decisions such as whether he will take a hard line on certain
types of crime, and it is unrealistic to expect that he can perform
this task and still maintain a detached, objective view of the exact
strength of each individual case. Indeed, that is not his function. 87
84. In the District of Columbia, most of the screening is undertaken by the prose•
cutor prior to the time scheduled for the preliminary hearing. In consequence, very
few cases actually result in discharge at the preliminary hearing. See statistics col·
lected in PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT
233-35, figure 4, at 275 (1966). The Commission refers to the "pivotal role of the.
prosecutor in no papering or dismissing substantial numbers of cases • • • ." Id. at
235. In Chicago, on the other hand, the reverse is true. There the prosecutor dismisses
very few cases but a substantial proportion are dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CruM. L.C. &
P.S. 463, 464 (1968). The author states that "[o]nly about 20 percent of the cases
receiving a hearing are bound over to the Grand Jury for further prosecution." Id.
at 463.
85. FED. R. CruM. P. 48(a). See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 239 (1966) (footnote omitted):
After initiating prosecution, the United States Attorney may still exercise his
discretion to terminate the case. Unlike his decision not to prosecute, however,
these decisions are supervised by the court, since the prosecutor must file a motion
to dismiss or request leave to enter a nolle prosequi. As a practical matter, few
of these requests are denied.
In fiscal 1965, cases involving 15 percent of the felony defendants were termi•
nated prior to trial • • • • Most of these dismissals occur on motion of the
U.S. Attorney and are an exercise of his prosecutive discretion.
86. Copy of interview on file at Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. ·when references are made in the
text to interviews commenting on the preliminary hearing in the District of Columbia,
and to practices relating to the hearing, supporting data is on file at the Institute of
Criminal Law, Georgetown University Law Center, under whose auspices the inter•
views were conducted.
87. The difference between a judicial and prosecutorial assessment of the appro-

1382

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1861

There are thus two drawbacks of depending on the prosecutor to
screen out cases. First, unless he has to be prepared to make a
prompt showing of probable cause he will naturally tend to postpone review. In addition, he does, and should, have a prosecutorial
viewpoint. Both of these shortcomings are better remedied by preliminary hearing than by grand jury screening.
The fact that the preliminary hearing is both public and adversary makes its screening more independent than the grand jury's.BB It
is also more difficult to conceal evidentiary weaknesses at a preliminary hearing. Because the grand jury is composed of laymen, it
is incompetent to make legal decisions about whether a prima facie
case against the defendant exists. Indeed, since the Supreme Court
held in Costello v. United StatesB 0 that a valid indictment may be
priateness of felony prosecution may be seen in connection with charges arising out
of the April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C., following the death of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. According to a newspaper account, a veteran district judge, reviewing several hundred indictments in those cases, was of the opinion that the evidence
in most of them was too weak for the cases to be tried as felonies. Washington Evening
Star, Oct. 10, 1968, at Bl. The article reported that the judge said "that his review of
more than 2:70 indictments charging 499 defendants may indicate about 25 'hard core'
felonies. [The judge] said there is a number of cases the government cannot prove,
and that many others could be reduced to misdemeanors ••••" Yet those cases had
been screened by the prosecutor, the preliminary hearing, and the grand jury. For an
account of preliminary hearings in the riot cases see Washington Post, April 28, 1968,
at DI. The Post reported that at that time about 250 persons had been held for the
grand jury after preliminary hearing, that only four defendants had waived the hearing,
and that 25 defendants had had charges against them dismissed at preliminary hearing.
In addition, the Post reported, "charges have been reduced or dropped in about
another 250 cases." Id. Presumably action in these latter cases was an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion; see note 84 supra.
88. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke Law School pointed out in testimony before
the Subcommittee, the preliminary hearing is
an adversary proceeding. This is why a defendant is given the right to crossexamine, to call witnesses and to testify in his own behalf. He does not have
these rights before a grand jury. Indeed, it is a crime for him to communicate
with the grand jury without authority. Probable cause has already been determined ex parte by either an officer arresting without a warrant or by a commissioner or judge in issuing a warrant. One reason for the commissioner's hearing
is to test the assertion of probable cause by the best truth-seeking device which
we have been able to develop-cross-examination by counsel.
Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University made a
similar point:
The bill treats the probable cause screening function of the grand jury on the
same qualitative level as the probable cause determination by a judicial officer at
a preliminary hearing. It leaves it to the prosecutor to decide which procedure
will be made available to an arrested person. Yet can it be seriously argued that
probable cause determined by laymen in secret under the guidance of the prosecutor and in the absence of the defendant and his counsel is anywhere near as
protective of individual rights as the determination of probable cause by a judicial
officer at a public preliminary hearing in the presence of the defendant and his
counsel with the right of the defendant to cross-examine and present evidence in
his own behalf?
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 139. See also id. at 160 (testimony of Lawrence Speiser on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
89. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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returned solely on the basis of hearsay testimony, there is no pretense that federal grand juries screen out cases in which no competent evidence exists.90 An indictment based on illegally obtained
evidence is slightly more vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, 91 but
whenever the court grants such a motion, screening by the grand
jury has obviously failed. Moreover, the defendant may already
have spent substantial time in jail prior to the ruling on the motion.
At the present time, there is little authority to support legal
objection to a federal committing magistrate's basing probable
cause on hearsay or tainted evidence; 92 the Federal Rules of Crim90. In the Second Circuit, the courts have severely criticized the practice of relying
on hearsay evidence before the grand jury when better evidence is available, and have
implied that the continuation of such a practice might result in quashing the indictment. See United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1969).
91. See Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States
v. Tane, 329 F. 2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963). But cf. United States v. Blue, 384
U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966). There surely are stronger reasons for quashing an indictment
based on illegally obtained evidence than for quashing an indictment based on hearsay. Note, Criminal Procedure-Grand Jury-Validity of Indictment Based Solely on
Hearsay Questioned When Direct Testimony is Readily Available, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv.
578, 581 (1968): "Unlike the coerced confession or the illegal wiretap which will never
have probative value at trial, hearsay, by its very nature, may be translated into
competent evidence by the time of trial if the originator or primary source of the
hearsay testifies in court."
92. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has implied that, at least
in certain types of cases, the committing magistrate should not be satisfied with the
establishment of probable cause by hearsay evidence when first-hand testimony is
available. See Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (footnote
omitted):
[W]e do not decide whether a Government case composed solely of hearsay can or
cannot satisfy the requirement of "competent evidence" in a preliminary hearing.
We decide only that under the circumstances shown here the decision and reasons
of the Commissioner, on the [defendant's] request for the subpoena [the complaining witness in a rape case], were clearly erroneous.
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (statements of Judges McGowan and
Leventhal, on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane) (footnote omitted):
A judicial officer engaged in a judicial determination of probable cause can
hardly rest easy solely with the hearsay account of the policeman of what these
eye-witnesses told him if the eye-witnesses can be available, so that he can listen
to their versions and observe their demeanor and provide an opportunity to
defense counsel to explore their account on cross-examination.
See also Wilson v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) Gudge Bazelon,
dissenting):
Since Rule 5 guarantees the right of cross-examination at preliminary hearings,
the question arises whether the rules concerning hearsay testimony are relevant.
See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1362, 1367 (3d ed. 1940). If so, it may be improper for
the material witnesses to "testify" at the hearing only through the hearsay testimony of the arresting police officer • . . •
The Staff of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery noted:
"Apparently there has been virtually no case law discussion of the admissibility of
hearsay evidence in preliminary hearings, and the question is open." Staff Memo•
randum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 273, 274. The memorandum points out that in the
District of Columbia, the "Court of Appeals for the first time is beginning to lay
down standards for the proper conduct of a preliminary hearing . • . [the issue of
the use of hearsay at the hearing] was expressly left open in Washington v. Clemmer
••.•" Id. (citation omitted).
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inal Procedure do not even deal with the question of what evidence
can be admitted at preliminary hearings. The Manual For United
States Commissioners states that "[p]robable cause is competent evidence [sic] which induces a reasonable ground for the inference that
the charges may be well founded." 93 But committing magistrates
simply do not follow this precept on any large scale.94 In the District
of Columbia, for example, not only is hearsay evidence admitted at
preliminary hearings, but probable cause is often founded on hearsay alone.95 But the preliminary hearing's deficiency on this point is
potentially remediable,96 whereas the grand jury's is not.
In concluding that it is unnecessary for a committing magistrate
to determine probable cause when the grand jury acts with relative
promptness, the draftsmen of the Federal Magistrates Act did not
seriously consider the potential usefulness of the preliminary hearing as a screening device. This is clear from the manner in which
the Senate Committee report attempts to rebut the "number of
witnesses [who] suggested that preliminary examinations should be
held in all cases, despite intervening indictments, and that the preliminary examination should to some degree take the place of grand
jury proceedings." 97 Instead of addressing itself to the screening
rationale underlying this argument, the report erroneously assumes
that the sole reason for making the preliminary hearing mandatory
would be to provide the defendant with discovery. The immediately
succeeding language of the report is confined to a lengthy justification for the Committee's conclusion that "the problem of discovery
should be treated separately from that of the preliminary hearing." 98
The Committee's Report contains no discussion of the screening
value of the preliminary hearing. 99
93. MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES CoMMISSIONERS 10 (1948) (emphasis added).
94. See Address of Chief Justice Warren to Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, May 20, 1964, in 35 F.R.D. 181, 189 (1964).
95. See note 86 supra.
96. See pt. IV. B. infra.
97. S. REP. No. 371, at 34.
98. Id. For a discussion of this position, see text accompanying notes 117-28 infra.
99. It is also clear from his testimony before a House subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that Senator Tydings assumed that those witnesses who had
emphasized the importance of the preliminary hearing did so only for the discovery
advantages it offered. House Hearings on S. 945, at 74.
The Staff Memorandum prepared to accompany the draft legislation similarly
assumes that the preliminary hearing serves no screening function which cannot be
performed better by the grand jury:
Viewed solely as a means of determining probable cause, the preliminary hearing
is rendered obsolete by the modem practice-at least in urban areas-of a grand
jury sitting continuously, returning indictments soon after an accused is taken into
custody or even before he is arrested. It surely seems unnecessary and wasteful to
have the question of probable cause determined twice, particularly when the firs&
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The Subcommittee heard testimony criticizing the practice of
United States Attorneys who moot the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing by racing to the grand jury for an indictment.100
But some concern was directed not so much to the grand jury indictment mooting the hearing, as to the possibility of excessive
delay in obtaining the indictment. 101 The draftsmen were responsive only to the latter criticism. Their purpose was not to insure
that all defendants receive a preliminary hearing; instead, it was to
insure that they not be held "too long" without either a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment.102 It was this accomplishment of section 303 which President Johnson noted during the
bill-signing ceremony.
The influence of Senator Tydings may well have been decisive
against ensuring the defendant the right to a preliminary hearing.
His personal experience seemed to belie the widely accepted view
that the grand jury is an inadequate means of protecting the defendant. In response to a subcommittee witness who was "of the
opinion that the grand jury proceedings provide no real safeguard
for a person's constitutional and civil rights," Senator Tydings
stated: "As one who was charged with a violation of the Corrupt
Practices Act and not indicted, I cannot quite agree with you.
The grand jury is, probably, a safeguard for the individual, too.
I have been on both sides of the fence. That is for the record."103 It
is unfortunate that Senator Tydings sought to generalize from such
an atypical incident. When a similar colloquy arose later in the hearings and the Senator again referred to his experience as proof "that
the grand juries in this country protect the innocent as well as return
determination at the preliminary hearing is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the district court to proceed to the trial of the case.
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 14. Like the Senator, the memorandum
proceeds to explain that discovery can best be provided elsewhere. Id. at 15.
100. Hearings, pt. I, at 14, 37 (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lindquist of Temple
University and F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commissioner, Bethesda, Maryland);
Hearings, pt. 3, at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving Younger of New York University).
101. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 242-43 (testimony of Judge Rozel C. Thomsen of the
District of Maryland); Hearings on S. 3,475, at 99-100 (testimony of Prof. Lloyd L.
Weinreb of Harvard University).
102. A staff memorandum concluded that the "novel procedure," provided for in
18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969). This section is quoted in note 6 supra, and
seems to serve the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing; namely, to allow an
arrested person a prompt determination by an appropriate authority of whether
his detention is justified. This seems to be the only conceivable purpose of a preliminary hearing that is not or cannot be served by other procedures in the law.
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 15.
103. Hearings, pt. 1, at 14. The witness, Charles A. Lindquist, was drawing a comparison between grand jury and preliminary hearing, criticizing the ability of the
prosecutor to obtain an indictment and thereby moot the hearing, and advocating that
"the preliminary hearing [be] made to serve a more useful purpose." Id.
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charges against the guilty," the witness, Lawrence Speiser of the
American Civil Liberties Union, responded: "I might suggest that
the grand jury considering the case of a former U.S. attorney or U.S.
attorney might be slightly different than when it considers the
majority of matters which come before it." 104 It is possible that
Senator Tydings' former practice as a United States Attorney was
another factor underlying the congressional assumption that the
preliminary hearing is unnecessary when the grand jury has acted.
In the hearings he made it clear that during his tenure as a prosecutor the preliminary hearing was regularly mooted by indictment,
even if the defendant had indicated that he wished to have a hearing.105
It is ironic that statutory contraction of the committing magistrates' preliminary hearing function comes at a time when the
magistrates themselves will be better qualified to perform it, and
when substantial new judicial duties are being entrusted to them.100
104. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 160.
105. Hearings, pt. 1, at 37:
Senator TYDINGS. Do you feel that in any revision or study that is related to the
commissioners that there should definitely be a provision made for preliminary
hearings giving a defendant the absolute right of a preliminary hearing?
Mr. MEATYARD. Giving the defendant the right of a preliminary hearing?
Yes, I do.
Senator TYDINGS. For instance, do you feel that Tom Kenney's policy as
U.S. attorney, which is directly opposite to his predecessor's policy-namely-mine,
would be a better policy, that is to say, where a defendant has indicated that he
wishes to have a preliminary hearing, he should be permitted to have a pre•
liminary hearing prior to any U.S. attorney being able to take the case to the
grand jury?
Mr. MEATYARD. I think so, yes. That points up the need that you are going
to have to select capable personnel to conduct preliminary hearings.
The witness, F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., had served as United States commissioner at
Bethesda, Maryland, for approximately nineteen years. Id. at 15.
106. The laudable purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act was "to abolish the
office of U.S. commissioner and reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into
an effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S.
magistrates." S. REP. No. 371, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 11. The new magistrates are
required to be attorneys "unless it is impossible to find a qualified attorney to fill a
particular position" and the "anachronistic fee system of compensation" is replaced
by "a system of salaries set on a sliding scale according to anticipated workload." Id.
The question of whether magistrates have been adequately upgraded, or whether
their judicial functions would more properly be exercised by an article Ill judge, is
beyond the scope of this Article. The dissenting views on this point by Mr. Cahill to
the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which approved the bill, raise
some serious questions. Representative William T. Cahill argues:
Our Constitution does not refer to, nor provide authority for, a Federal magis•
trate system. To the contrary, article Ill specifically provides that Federal judicial
power must be vested in "the Supreme Court and such other inferior courts, as
the Congress may from time to time establish." Moreover, article II requires that
judges of the Supreme Court and "All other officers of the United States whose
appointments shall be established by law" must be appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Federal judges are also provided
lifetime tenure, and protection against diminution of their salaries.
Contrary to these constitutional provisions, magistrates would be appointed by
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In the past, the magistrates' lack of judicial qualifications undoubtedly contributed to the assumption that the preliminary hearing and the grand jury proceeding serve much the same purpose; if
both procedures may be conducted by laymen and dominated by the
prosecutor, there appears little reason to choose between them.
Almost one third of the more than 700 current United States Commissioners are not lawyers, 107 and previously only minimal efforts
had been made to provide them with "on the job training"-even
if such instruction were feasible in such a complex and rapidly
changing field. Formal legal assistance was largely limited to that
provided in the Manual for United States Commissioners, a wholly
inadequate pamphlet distributed by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts and not revised since 1948.108 The opening paragraph of the Manual, after assuring commissioners that they
should feel free to confer with the district court judge when necessary, goes on to say:
In any case where the commissioner desires the assistance and advice
of the United States attorney or his assistants at any stage of a proFederal district court judges for a tenure of only 8 years. Yet these officers of court
would be empowered to adjudicate an unlimited and undefined range of Federal
••• civil, and criminal matters.
H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 44. In addition to the constitutional questions, Representative
Cahill points to the disadvantages of allowing district court judges to appoint officials
whose salaries range up to $22,500. Id. at 46. This point had also been raised during
the hearings. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 282 (testimony of Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke
Law School); Hearings on S. 3,475, at 132-33 (statement of Prof. Samuel Dash of
Georgetown University).
Section 302 of the Act expands the magistrates' trial jurisdiction to misdemeanors
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than
$1,000 or both, subject to the defendant's election to be tried by a magistrate and his
right to appeal to the district court. S. REP. No. 371, at 8-9; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at
11-12. The district courts are empowered to promulgate rules assigning the magistrates
"such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." Section 101 of the Act, amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1964). The
subsection continues:
The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the
applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
the United States district courts;
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and
(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals
convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations
to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as
to whether there should be a hearing.
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
107. S. REP. No. 371, at 10; H. REP. No. 1,629, at 13.
108. See Testimony of Warren Olney, III, Director, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Hearings, pt. 2, at 156-57. See also Hearings, pt. I, at 25 (testimony of Fritz 1,V. Windhorst, U.S. Commissioner, New Orleans, La.) Seventy-seven per
cent of the commissioners who responded to the Subcommittee's questionnaire indicated that they thought the Manual was in need of revision. Questionnaire 471.
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ceeding, or in conducting a preliminary examination, he should
make a request of the United States attorney therefor .... At times
the advice of the United States law enforcement agencies may also
be helpful.109
Excessive reliance on prosecutors and law enforcement agencies was
apparent from the responses of some commissioners to a questionnaire sent to them by the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery; 110 in fact, some nonlawyer commissioners
cited the ability to turn to the prosecutor for advice as a reason
why legal training was unnecessary for committing magistrates.111
A further reason why legal training for magistrates may have
seemed unnecessary under the previous commissioner system was the
fact that the defendant usually had no lawyer to raise legal questions.
Many federal defendants are indigent,112 but neither Congress113 nor
the Supreme Court provided for appointment of counsel prior to the
defendant's arraignment upon the indictment114 until 1964, when
109. MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 1 (1948) (emphasis added). The final
admonition that "the commissioner should always bear in mind that his judicial
decisions should be his own, based on the law and the facts in the light of his own
best judgment," can hardly undo the damage to that independent judicial spirit which
the Manual formally endorses, but has in fact undercut.
110. See note 50 supra; note 111 infra. When the commissioners were asked by the
Subcommittee how they were informed of recent decisions affecting their duties, some
of their responses
again seemed to indicate reliance on the presecutors [sic] and law enforcement
agents:
"Not informed, but U.S. Attorney very helpful in giving any advice asked-I
really depend on U.S. Atty. &: F.BJ. to avoid technical mistakes."
"Actually the U.S. Attorney helps as much as anyone."
"Informed by federal judge, F .BJ. agents-U .S. Clerks of Court and U.S.
Deputy Marshals-and by mail."
"Only by the grapevine or hearsay."
"Usually receive directions from U.S. Attorney, or clerk or [sic] anything
important."
Questionnaire 471.
111. Questionnaire 463.
112. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON POVERTY AND THE .ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 20 (1963): "[I]t is the Committee's best judgment
that in the country as a whole something over one-third of federal defendants are
financially unable to supply themselves with competent counsel and that in many federal districts one-half or more of such defendants find themselves in this position.''
113. See note 115 infra and accompanying text. In 1960, however, Congress had
provided for representation of indigents in the District of Columbia. District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, D.C. CODE §§ 2-2201-10 (1967). The Act specifically provided for
representation by Legal Aid attorneys "in preliminary hearings in felony cases.'' D.C.
CODE § 2-2202 (1967). It was probably not purely coincidence that the landmark
decision of Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
944 (1965), followed by three years the establishment of the Legal Aid Agency in 1961.
Blue relied on "what we conceive to be the letter, as it is certainly the spirit, of the
1960 statute" in requiring the United States commissioner to inform the defendant of
his right to the assignment of counsel. 342 F .2d at 898.
114. See note 115 infra. The Attorney General's committee found that "[i]n most
federal districts appointed counsel first enters the case when the accused is brought
before the court on arraignment and is required to plead to the indictment." AT-
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the Criminal Justice Act provided for appointment of counsel
at the preliminary-hearing stage.115 Providing counsel tends to increase the frequency of preliminary hearings, since unrepresented
defendants often waived preliminary hearings or failed to object
when the prosecutor requested a postponement in order to moot the
hearing by indictment. The staff of the Senate Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery reported:
A number of commissioners expressed concern as to whether defendants without counsel understand the nature and purpose of the
preliminary hearing. They indicated that his [sic] failure to understand results in frequent waiver by uncounselled defendants:
"It is difficult to explain the significance of the preliminary hearing
to many."
"Even after thorough explanation some defendants don't seem to
understand what a preliminary examination is." 116
TORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY
INAL JumCE, REPORT 27 (1963).

AND THE

.ADMINIS1'RATION OF FEDERAL CRIM-

115. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). The House Report
stated:
[G]uaranteeing counsel at every stage of the proceedings, commencing with the
initial appearance before the commissioner, is designed to afford representation to
each defendant throughout his involvement in the judicial process. It insures that
the advice of counsel will be available at the critical early stages when recollections
are fresh and the opportunity to uncover evidence is greatest.
H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). In 1966, the Supreme Court reflected
the change by amending rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to guarantee the defendant's right to the assignment of counsel "at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the commissioner." FED. R. CRIM. P. 44
Prior to its amendment in 1966, the rule had provided: "If the defendant appears in
court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign
counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." The Court also amended rule 5(b) to
require that the magistrate inform defendants of this right. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b),
Advisory Committee Note to 1966 amendment: "The second change obligates the
commissioner to inform the defendant of his right to request the assignment of
counsel if he is unable to retain counsel." Prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule 5(b),
the commissioner was required to inform the defendant only "of his right to retain
counsel."
116. Questionnaire 479. Surprisingly, fifty-five per cent of the commissioners
who responded to the questionnaire thought that the frequency of waiver was not
significantly affected by whether the accused was represented by counsel. Id. The need
for counsel at preliminary hearing is forcefully asserted in 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE
OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 76 (1965):
Apart from the possibility of a constitutional requirement, it seems clear that
counsel should be present at the preliminary hearing, since the defendant without
counsel at that stage is at a tactical disadvantage, as pointed out in several of the
state reports. First, he does not know whether to ask for the hearing or to waive
it. If the hearing is held, he does not know how to cross-examine the state's witnesses, or whether to testify himself. He does not know whether to ask that a record
be made of the hearing. He does not know the requisite legal elements of the
offense with which he is charged, nor of lesser related offenses, so he is unable
to discuss intelligently with the prosecutor possible reduction or dismissal of the
charges. Moreover, it is possible, especially if the committing magistrate is untrained in the law, that the defendant will be bound over for the grand jury on
insufficient evidence or that political considerations will affect his decision.
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The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and the Federal Magistrates
Act of 1968, taken together, offer for the first time in the federal
jurisdiction the promise that preliminary hearings will generally
have both counsel and a tribunal qualified to perform the hearings'
important screening function. Unless this potential is frustrated by
section 303 of the Magistrates Act, the preliminary hearing should
at last be able to fulfill its potential as a screening mechanism
through which felony cases should pass before going on to the grand
jury and to trial.
B. Congressional Approach to the Discovery

Function of the Hearing
By providing that a preliminary hearing is unnecessary if an
indictment is returned within the time limits specified in section 303,
the draftsmen of the Magistrates Act made clear their view that
discovery was no longer, if it ever had been, an independently valid
purpose of the hearing. 117 The subcommittee was not, apparently,
unimpressed with the testimony it heard stressing the need for discovery in criminal cases. 118 But it was not convinced that discovery
should take place at the preliminary hearing.
In general, the hearing affords the defendant an opportunity to
learn the basis of the charges against him, by testimony given under
oath and subject to cross-examination, shortly after the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.119 The draftsmen were not
unaware of these advantages, but in justifying section 303 they
emphasized the lack of uniformity in defendants' ability to obtain
a preliminary hearing. The Senate committee report correctly noted
that
the degree of discovery obtained in a preliminary hearing will vary
depending on how much evidence the presiding judicial officer
thinks is necessary to establish probable cause in a particular case.
This may be quite a bit, or it may be very little, but in either event
117. See note 99 supra.
118. S. REP. No. !!71, at !14.
119. See note 40 supra. See also Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases,
33 F.R.D. 47, 70 (1964) (remarks of Professor Frank J. Remington):
[D]iscovery in a State like Wisconsin, which has little formal discovery, may in fact
be much more complicated than it may appear. Although the preliminary examination was in its inception and certainly in its theory designed to afford a pro•
tection against being subjected to a trial when there does not exist probable cause
to hold a person for trial, there is no question whatsoever that in practice it is used
largely, if not entirely, as a discovery device. As a consequence, at least where
the defendant is adequately represented, he is able to learn a great deal about the
prosecution's case by demanding a preliminary examination.
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it need not be all the evidence ·within the possession of the Government that should be subject to discovery.120

Moreover, as Senator Tydings pointed out, defendants first arrested
after indictment rather than pursuant to rule 4 are ineligible for a
preliminary hearing and so cannot use it as a discovery device.121
This is a negative equal protection rationale which would deny
discovery opportunities to some defendants because the law fails to
grant them to others.
A second principal reason for the committee's conclusion that the
preliminary hearing does not afford "an ideal opportunity for discovery"122 was its belief that the hearing "should be held within a
short time after the accused is first arrested. Discovery, on the other
hand, can most usefully take place at a later stage, much closer to
trial, when the evidence is more nearly complete and defense counsel is better prepared."123 No doubt discovery closer to trial, after
attorneys for both sides have had an opportunity to become familiar
with the case, would serve a useful purpose. But the defendant also
has a vital interest in obtaining discovery promptly. Because human
memory is fallible, evidence which is obtained immediately after
the event is more likely to be reliable than evidence which is given
later; 124 defense lawyers are well aware of the tactical advantage in120. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. See United States v. Bates, 287 F. Supp. 657, 661 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968):
Having concluded that the purpose in seeking to call the witness was to obtain
discovery and not to shed light upon the issue of probable cause, the Commissioner
was acting within his inherent authority to confine the preliminary hearing to
the matters in issue in declining to require that ATU [Alcohol Tax Unit] Agent
Sampley submit to examination by the defendant.
None of the witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee and no one interviewed
in the District of Columbia project (see note 86 supra) favored adoption of the English
practice at preliminary hearing. Prior to Parliament's enactment of the Criminal Justice
Act of 1967, the English preliminary hearing was a full-scale discovery proceeding at
which all witnesses whom the government planned to use at trial had to be called.
Williams, Introductory Survey of the Preliminary Examination in England, in Hearings
on S. J,475, at 307. The disadvantage lay in the "enormous waste of time by magistrates in having to take down the depositions of prosecution witnesses (by the hand
of their clerk)." The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 sought to overcome this problem
by providing that the defendant might waive the hearing, and in return for waiver,
obtain written depositions of all the witnesses. Id.
121. Hearings on S. J,475, at 29: "[U]nder current doctrines it will always be possible to bypass the preliminary hearing-and therefore discovery-by proceeding
rapidly to indictment after arrest, or by arresting the defendant ohly after an indictment has been returned.''
122. S. REP. No. 371, at 34.
123. Id. at 34-35; cf. Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. J,475, at 29, 35.
124. See G. WILUAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 104-05 (3d ed. 1963) (footnotes omitted):
[I]t really needs no psychologist to show that, although instances occur of delayed
reproduction, memory generally fades with the passage of time, and that, when a
witness is required more than once to recall an event, his act of recall on a subsequent occasion may be merely an imperfect memory of what he said on an
earlier. If this is true, it is an interesting commentary on the legal rule whereby
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herent in preserving witnesses' testimony before it becomes "polished" or influenced by subsequent experiences.125 Nor does the
value of preserving early recollection always lie with the defendant.
Testimony favorable to the prosecution may also be "frozen" at the
preliminary hearing while witnesses or victims are feeling particularly hostile to the defendant-before affection, remorse, sympathy,
or fear may have diluted the quality of their testimony. Moreover,
by encouraging the prosecutor to test his case only in the secrecy
and security of the grand jury setting, the new legislation reduces
the government's chance of learning how well its witnesses will perform in public and under cross-examination.
The draftsmen's position would have been more tenable if their
criticism of the adequacy of the preliminary hearing as a discovery
device had been accompanied by a substitute proposal for discovery.
In an early formulation of the bill, they provided such a substitute
by a legislative directive to adopt discovery measures through the
rulemaking process. A published staff memorandum, commenting
on a preliminary unpublished draft of the Act, states that
the bill contains a guiding statement enjoining the rulemakers to
take into account not only the benefits to the judicial process of
liberal pretrial discovery, but also national security interests and
the wellbeing of witnesses in cases where an unfettered discovery procedure might jeopardize either. The rules can therefore provide for
appropriate exception to the general right of discovery when the
Government can show good cause for making such an exception.126

Unfortunately, the discovery provision had been dropped by the
time that the first printed draft of the legislation appeared.127 In its
stead, the Committee appended a concluding exhortation to its
the witness's statement, given in court perhaps months after the event, is the real
evidence, while his original proof of evidence, given perhaps within hours of the
event, and his deposition at the preliminary hearing, given a few days or weeks
after the event, are referred to only for the purpose of contradicting him and not
as independent evidence.
Chapter 5, Mistaken Evidence, which includes this quotation, is a sobering appraisal
of the extent to which reliance should be placed on eyewitness testimony.
125. See note 86 supra. A typical observation of a defense lawyer is, "I think it's
important to get [testimony] on the record before it's gotten too polished, as it does
by the time it's gone through grand jury and to the stage of trial." Or, "you have a
situation [at preliminary hearing] where these people are committed to a position
before they haYe had a chance to talk to many friends or neighbors or other witnesses,
before they have been influenced, and perhaps improperly."
126. Staff Memorandum, April 28, 1966, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 16.
127. The first printed draft of S. 3,475 is reproduced in Hearings on S. 3,475, at
17-25. A second staff memorandum, prepared to accompany S. 3,475 and dated June 7,
1966, is almost identical with its predecessor cited in note 126 supra. See Staff Memo•
randum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 29. Significantly, however, the language quoted in the
text accompanying note 126 is omitted.
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discussion of why discovery was not a valid purpose of the preliminary hearing: "[T]he committee does urge the Judicial Conference
and the Supreme Court to give careful consideration to further
liberalization of the existing discovery procedures provided in criminal rule 16."128
C. Problems of Construction
As a matter of draftsmanship, it is unfortunate that section 303
is written as an amendment to section 3060 of title 18 rather than
as an amendment to rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. While former section 3060 consisted solely of a crossreference to the provisions of rule 5(a)-(c),129 section 3060, as
amended by section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act, eliminates
any cross-reference to rule 5. Presumably this omission was not intended to repeal subsections (a) and (b) of rule 5; despite the deletion
of the Code section's cross-reference to them, nothing in the legislative history supports their implied repeal. But subsection (c) of rule
5 presents a more difficult question of implied repeal. For the new
section 3060, entitled "Preliminary examination," is sufficiently
comprehensive so that it arguably replaces the shorter rule 5(c).
The new section 3060(£) speaks in terms of "[p]roceedings before
United States magistrates under this section," 130 not "under Rule
5(c).'' The preceding subsection, 3060(c), provides that "[n]o preliminary examination in compliance with subsection (a) of this section shall be required ...." when a timely indictment intervenes.
This presumably does not contemplate the possibility that a preliminary examination in compliance with rule 5(c) could still
be required. Thus, the provision in rule 5 (c) authorizing a preliminary examination is apparently superseded by subsection (a) of section 3060, and section 3060(a) is meant to be the sole source of the
right to a preliminary examination. But if rule 5(c) is repealed to
the extent that it no longer provides the basis for holding a preliminary hearing, do the incidents of the hearing prescribed by rule 5(c)
-including the defendant's right to cross-examine and to introduce
evidence-survive the implicit repeal of the basic provision authorizing a hearing? Or are these and other incidents of the hearing
to be prescribed by courts and magistrates as part of a process of
128. S. REP. No. 371, at 35.
129. A number of sections of title 18 follow this same form. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3001741 (1964).
130. The new section provides: "Proceedings before the United States magistrates
under this section shall be taken down by a court reporter •••." 18 U.S.CA. § 3060
(Supp. Feb. 1969) (empasis is added). This section is reprinted in note 6 supra.
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formulating rules of procedure and evidence needed to carry out the
mandate of section 3060(a): "preliminary examination shall be held
... to determine whether there is probable cause ...."? The latter construction seems more consistent with the rest of new section
3060; it would also leave greater scope for judicial implementation
of improvements in preliminary hearing procedures.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Some of the potential drawbacks of the Federal Magistrates Act
can be mitigated or overcome through judicial action in formulating
case law or rules of procedure. We shall here consider what steps,
short of legislative amendment, may be taken to rectify apparent
deficiencies in the Act and to take advantage of the opportunities it
affords.
A. Prompt Hearing
We have thus far assumed that the prosecutor will be allowed to
avoid the preliminary hearing if he is able to obtain an indictment
within the time limits specified in the Act. This is a plausible assumption in view of the previous widespread practice in which United
States Commissioners, without any express legislative authorization,
willingly granted continuances of preliminary hearings so that prosecutors would have enough time to moot the hearing.131 But betterqualified magistrates will be appointed under the Act, and such
solicitude for prosecutorial convenience may be at an end. Other
jurisdictions are free to accept the example of the District of Columbia Circuit132 and refuse to tolerate this practice, for the Act does
not in terms give the United States Attorney a free hand to moot the
hearing so long as he does so promptly.133 Section 3060(b) provides
for a hearing "within a reasonable time," "but in any event not later
than" ten or twenty days after the defendant's initial appearance.
"These are outer limits only," the Senate committee report states,
"and a court or magistrate may well decide that a reasonable time
131. See S. REP. No. 371, at 33; Hearings, pt. 1, at 14, 37 (testimony of Prof.
Charles A. Lindquist of Temple University and F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commissioner, Bethesda, Maryland); Hearings, pt. 3, at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving
Younger of New York University), 254-55 (statement of Judge Talbot Smith of the
Eastern District of Michigan).
132. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
133. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969) (quoted in note 6 supra). The
contrary implication in an early staff memorandum is not borne out by the legislation, as other legislative history indicates. See note 134 infra and accompanying text.
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 15: "The bill .•• provides for a preliminary hearing only in those cases in which the grand jury has not acted within a
reasonable time after arrest and presentment."
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is well within these limits under the circumstances of a particular
case." 134 Such a "particular case" should be interpreted by the
courts to include any case in which the defendant demands an immediate hearing, unless the government can show the same "extraordinary circumstances" which would authorize a delay beyond the
ten- or twenty-day limit under section 3060(c). This interpretation
would not be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act; 135 the evil
that section 303 purportedly sought to overcome was the practice of
detaining a defendant indefinitely with no probable cause determination by either magistrate or grand jury.136
Unless the "reasonable time" requirement in section 3060(b) is
construed to mean less time than it takes to procure an indictment,
the United States Attorneys' offices will be able to revert to the practice of racing to the grand jury in order to moot the defendant's
right to a hearing. As noted above, judges on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit have said that they would see
no objection to requiring a hearing after indictment; 137 but this was
prior to passage of the Magistrates Act, and the Act specifically states
that "[n]o preliminary examination ... shall be required ... if ...
an indictment is returned." 138 This language will undoubtedly make
it more difficult for courts to control prosecutors' attempts to circumvent the preliminary hearing, but one option is still available to
the federal judiciary: under the Act, the courts retain the power to
require that a preliminary hearing be held on demand, without waiting for the time limits given in the Act to expire. Affording the
134. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. See also Hearings on S. 3,475, at 241 (remarks of Senator
Tydings) (emphasis added): "Let me emphasize that these are only outer limits, and
that the bill reaffirms the requirement that the preliminary hearing be held within
a reasonable time. In most cases a reasonable time may be well within the outer limits."
135. Cf. the exchange between Senator Tydings and Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb
of Harvard University, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 99-100. In his prepared statement,
Professor Weinreb had said:
Even as prescribing the outside limits of a "reasonable time," the periods specified
are too long. There are no circumstances in which a person should be detained
unwillingly for as much as ten days before it is competently determined even
whether he should be held for trial. • . . In no circumstances, should the preliminary examination be delayed because the Government is building its case;
if the Government lacks probable cause to detain, it should not arrest. Contrary to
a suggestion implicit in the Subcommittee's staff memorandum, in no circumstance
should timing of the examination be fixed so that an indictment can intervene and
avoid the hearing.
Id. at 105.
1!16. The legislative history contains no criticism of jurisdictions in which preliminary hearings are routinely held, but only of those jurisdictions where hearings are
routinely postponed pending return of an indictment. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 371, at 3!1;
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 28 (remarks of Senator Tydings).
137. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1967) Gudges McGowan and
Leventhal, voting to deny rehearing en bane); see text accompanying note 71 supra.
1!18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(e) (Supp. Feb. 1969) (quoted in note 6 supra).

1396

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1861

defendant a prompt preliminary hearing would assure continuation
of the screening and discovery advantages now available at preliminary hearing. Moreover, holding the hearing promptly after arrest
would reduce the incidence of "arrests for investigation."130

B. Rules of Evidence
After learning of the disparity in commissioners' practices concerning the admissibility of hearsay, Senator Tydings stated that
"there should be some statutory guidelines as to evidence which is
admissible in hearings for probable cause." 140 But no such guidelines
were included in the Act, and it seems likely that the point, which
was raised early in the hearings in 1965, had been forgotten when
the legislation was finally drafted.
At present, federal preliminary hearings are not generally held
pursuant to the usual rules of evidence. 141 Some years ago Chief
Justice Warren noted this fact and commented that a proposal before
the Judicial Conference to make the usual rules applicable to preliminary hearings provided the defendant waived indictment "would
be in accord with the more enlightened procedures developed in
some of the states of the Union." 142
139. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye stated in testimony before the Subcommittee:
The requirement that the defendant be brought before the commissioner without
unnecessary delay and the right of the defendant to have a hearing to determine
whether there is probable cause combine to discourage law enforcement officers
from arresting on suspicion and then investigating the case at their leisure to
determine whether there is probable cause.
Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. This advantage of the preliminary hearing was recognized over
a hundred years ago in New York, where concern was expressed over the "arrest of a
person upon testimony which would be insufficient to hold him, and his detention
until evidence can be hunted up, upon which the magistrate might be warranted in
committing him." NEW YORK STATE, FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE
AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE XXV (1849). The solution proposed was
that the preliminary hearing be held as soon as possible, preferably at one sitting.
If adjournments were necessary, the hearing was to be continued for only two days
at a time, and not more than six days in all, "unless by consent or on motion of the
defendant." Id. at xxvi. Cf. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 343 (1944):
Sometimes, too, the grand jury, unable to find a bill, would nevertheless have the
defendant kept in custody in the hope of developing at a later time sufficient evidence on which to charge the accused. Thus Robert Wilson appeared in the Supreme Court on March 19, 1727 /28, and "the Grand Jury not having sufficient
witness brought before them to find a bill of indictmt but in as much as
they can see strong cause of suspicion of felony agt him, they pray that the
Ct o'd him to be kept confined 'till the next Term."
140. Hearings, pt. 1, at 38.
141. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
142. Address of Chief Justice Warren to Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute, May 20, 1964, in 35 F.R.D. 181, 189 (1964). The Chief Justice added: "These
proposals will indeed require a great deal of study, but there can be no doubt that
to the extent their objectives can be realized, the process of criminal proceedings will
be fairer than it is now or has been in the past."
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So long as one third of the committing magistrates were not
lawyers and most defendants were not represented by counsel at
preliminary hearing such a development was not feasible. 143 With
the appointment of better-qualified magistrates, the courts or the
rulemaking bodies will be able to require that the hearing be conducted according to the usual rules of evidence. 144 There is, however, no valid reason for conditioning the application of evidentiary
rules upon the defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to
indictment. Such a condition is also open to serious constitutional
doubt. 145
There is a tendency to assume that the principal reason for objecting to hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing is a desire to
obtain discovery; if hearsay cannot be used to establish probable
cause, then the prosecution will be forced to resort to more revealing
direct testimony, and thus to provide the defense with an opportunity for cross-examination. It is true that eyewitness testimony
given at the hearing is a valuable kind of discovery; but eyewitness testimony also is obviously more reliable than hearsay for
the purpose of determining probable cause.146 In our view, it is time
143. The Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery inquired of all
United States Commissioners as to the kinds of evidence they admit at the preliminary
hearing. Surprisingly, forty-six per cent of the Commissioners who responded stated
that they admit only evidence that would be admissible in court. Questionnaire at
493, This statement must be received with some skepticism, especially since, as the
Staff Memorandum noted, "by far the largest group of non-lawyer commissioners who
responded said that they admit only evidence admissible in court." Id. (emphasis
added).
144. On March 31, 1969, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States released Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates (Preliminary Draft). Rule 11-01 makes
the proposed rules applicable at preliminary hearing before United States Magistrates.
The Advisory Committee's Note explicitly states that the rules are intended to apply
to preliminary hearings:
Nor does the rule exempt preliminary examinations in criminal cases. Authority as to the applicability of the rules of evidence to preliminary examinations has been meager and conflicting, Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L. J. 1149, ll68, n. 53
(1960); Comment, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 589, 592-593 (1958). Lack of legal training on the part of
presiding officers has no doubt tended to make application of the rules a practical impossibility. However, the enhanced standing of magistrates under the
Federal Magistrates Act, P.L. 90-578, removes this obstacle and is calculated to
increase the dignity of preliminary examinations. Moreover, compliance with the
rules of evidence is calculated to render effective the right of the accused to
cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence in his own behalf, under
Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The fundamental difference from grand jury proceedings is apparent.
Id. at 254.
145. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968) (maximum penalty
of life imprisonment instead of death sentence may not constitutionally be conditioned
upon waiver of right to trial by petit jury); Scott v. United States, No. 20,954, at IO
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 13, 1969).
146, See Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Statement of Judges
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to adopt the reform discussed by Chief Justice Warren and to require that preliminary hearings be conducted "under the usual rules
of evidence," except to the extent that these rules are waived by
consent of the parties.
In the interest of time, counsel on occasion would presumably
be willing to have some elements of the alleged offense, such as
chemical analysis of substances thought to contain narcotics, established by hearsay. Moreover, when an immediate hearing is sought,
necessary evidence may not yet be available. A number of commissioners told the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery that the need for more time to make further investigations and to obtain additional evidence is among the reasons which
the government asserts for seeking a continuance in the preliminary
hearing.147 To alleviate this problem, the government could be allowed to make a proffer of evidence which, for adequate reasons,
was not available at the time of the hearing-for example, because
it consisted of documentary proof being sent from elsewhere. If the
proffered evidence plus the available evidence does not establish
probable cause, the defendant should be discharged. Otherwise, the
defendant might agree either to have the proffer treated as evidence
or to obtain an adjournment of the hearing until the witness could
be produced. This procedure would both protect the defendant
from an illegal arrest for investigation and insure that the government would not have to release a defendant when probable cause
against him cannot be established immediately because essential evidence has not yet been received.
Application of the hearsay rule and the other usual rules
of evidence to the preliminary hearing is relatively simple. But the
question of excluding evidence on constitutional grounds raises more
complex problems. On the one hand, it makes little sense for a
qualified magistrate to conduct an adversary, judicial hearing and
then to hold the defendant when the only evidence against him
has obviously been obtained by unconstitutional means. On the
other hand, rule 4l(e) provides that motions for the suppression of
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure148 are to be made
McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane); cf.
Hearings, pt. 1, at 36 (testimony of F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commissioner,
Bethesda, Maryland).
147. Questionnaire at 485; c. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 105 (statement of Prof. Lloyd
L. Weinreb of Harvard).

148. Some courts have applied the same procedure to suppression of confessions.
See 3 c. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 673, at 108 (1969):
A number of courts have felt that if a motion to suppress is available before
trial when evidence has allegedly been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
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in district court; and, since suppression may turn upon complex
constitutional issues, there are grounds for not allowing committing
magistrates to make a final ruling.149 Unless hearings are mooted,
resolution of this dilemma will become increasingly urgent as better
qualified defense counsel and magistrates are involved in the hearings. A solution would be to permit the committing magistrate
to determine constitutional evidentiary issues only for purposes of
ruling upon the admissibility of evidence offered before him on the
issue of probable cause, leaving the defendant to his rule 4l(e)
remedy if he is held to answer.um But the government should be
allowed to petition the district court to set aside a discharge order
based upon exclusion of evidence alleged to be unlawfully obtained.

C. Result of Magistrate's Finding of No Probable Cause
The Magistrates Act does not change the existing law under which
the prosecutor may present a case to the grand jury even though the
committing magistrate has found no probable cause at the preliminary hearing. 151 In order to make preliminary hearing a meaningful screening device, a rule should be adopted providing that the
prosecutor, as an officer of the court, may not present evidence to a
grand jury in a case in which the magistrate has found no probable
cause at the hearing. An exception to this rule should be provided
ment, there should be a similar procedure available when it is claimed that evidence has been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly they
have held that a motion will lie when it is claimed that a confession was illegally
obtained.
See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (Supp. Feb. 1969).
149. The problem was clearly posed to the Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery by one committing magistrate:
I am faced with the attempt of the voluntary defender to prove by cross-examina•
tion at the preliminary hearing that the warrant was issued without probable
cause (by showing that the agent did not actually know what the complaint alleged), or, more important, that the arrest was illegal and without probable cause.
Up until now, I have allowed defense counsel to cross-examine on these matters,
but one of the enforcement agencies has seen fit to complain to the Court, and I
have been advised by the Court that I have no right to rule on these questions
since they must be decided by the Judges of the District Court under Rule 41.
This, in my opinion, results in a great injustice, especially where it is clear
from tl1e evidence before me that the warrant was illegally issued and/or that the
defendant was illegally arrested, and hence all the evidence following the arrest is
inadmissible, especially where admissions or confessions were obtained without
affording the defendant an opportunity to consult counsel.
Why should a defendant have to seek bail, be indicted, and probably be committed and wait months for a motion to be filed in Court after the indictment, or
at trial, in cases like this?
Questionnaire 492.
150. Implementation of this proposal might require a revision of rule 4l(e); see
3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 148, at 105: "[U]nder the rule [41(e)] the motion must be
made before the court while before adoption of the rule it could be made to a
United States commissioner." See also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
151. Some commissioners responding to the questionnaire expressed dissatisfaction
with the practice. Questionnaire 491.
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for instances in which the prosecutor obtains leave of court to seek
an indictment upon a showing that the magistrate erred. 152 Once the
government has chosen to follow the path of pre-indictment arrest
and preliminary hearing, the prosecutor should not be permitted to
make a mockery of that proceeding by seeking an indictment from
the grand jury in disregard of the magistrate's ruling. 153
D. Depositions for Discovery
The foregoing proposals would all retain or increase the amount
of discovery now effectively available at the preliminary hearing.
But even if all of them were adopted, discovery at preliminary hearings would, as the legislators pointed out,154 be haphazard. On the
other hand, if discovery at the preliminary hearing is reduced, either
because hearings are consistently mooted or because magistrates
terminate the proceedings as soon as probable cause is established,
then a uniquely valuable discovery tool will have been lost. In
either event, it is time that testimonial discovery in criminal cases
was extended on a more rational basis. Liberalization of the rules
governing the availability of grand jury minutes, Jencks Act155 state152. The federal grand jury would retain the power to indict on its own initiative,
but absent prosecutorial urging, such action is rare. See generally Hauberg v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Cf. Hearings on S. 3,475, at
140 (testimony of Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University). The witness advocated the adoption of the Pennsylvania ·practice of assuring the right to a preliminary hearing prior to the presentation of the case to the grand jury. See also
Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 69 (1964) (remarks
of Professor Frank J. Remington of the University of Wisconsin):
[I]n Wisconsin there is a right to a preliminary examination which cannot be
denied the defendant by resort to the grand jury. As a consequence, any defendant who requests a preliminary examination can get one. It is typically true that
the prosecution is required to put in much, if not all, of its case in order to
insure a finding of probable cause to hold a defendant for trial ••.. If the defendant has waived a preliminary examination, appears for arraignment and requests
assigned counsel, a statute in ·w·isconsin provides that he has a right to have the
case remanded for a preliminary examination.
153. In light of skepticism concerning the adequacy of the grand jury's screening of
probable cause, it may also be time to review the extent to which the prosecutor should
have discretion to seek an original indictment without the prior issuance of a complaint, upon which a rule 5(c) hearing would be held to determine probable cause.
In the District of Columbia, defendants are sometimes arrested on one charge, as to
which probable cause is found at preliminary hearing, and subsequently indicted on
others, the events in which may have occurred earlier. See Godfrey v. United States,
353 F.2d 456, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Hearings, pt. 3, at 279 (remarks of Dean A. Kenneth
Pye of Duke Law School); note 86 supra. Rather than allow the prosecutor to exercise
unfettered discretion as to whether to proceed by rule 5 or rule 9, it would be
preferable to delineate the kinds of cases as to which an original indictment is particularly appropriate (for example, income tax, antitrust and regulatory crimes, when the
defendant will often know the evidentiary basis for the indictment because it comes
largely from his own records). Alternatively, the prosecutor might be required to
obtain special leave of the district court, explaining the need for obtaining an original
indictment in an individual case.
154. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), and its application
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ments, and other ·written material will not provide an effective substitute for preliminary hearing discovery. All of them lack the advantage of direct confrontation and of having witnesses under oath
and subject to cross-examination.156 In our view, only the adoption
of deposition procedures, analogous to those that have long been
available in federal civil proceedings,157 would afford adequate and
consistent discovery in criminal cases.
The proposal for allowing depositions in criminal cases is by no
means new,158 but it seems to be gaining somewhat broader acceptance at present. At least limited support was recently provided by a
Task Force of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice:
It is undesirable to confine the use of depositions only to the
preservation of testimony of witnesses who may be unavailable at
trial. Depositions may be used to find facts as well as to preserve testimony. A deposition could resolve a factual dispute during the negotiating stage, and it could provide the basis for a stipulation of witnesses' testimony at trial. In cases where it is not necessary to conduct
a full preliminary hearing before a judge, depositions may be submitted to the court for determination of probable cause.159

Although only a handful of states have provisions permitting the use
of depositions in criminal cases,160 their use is becoming less uncommon.101
The Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery was in a unique position to explore the potentialities of the
deposition and other discovery mechanisms with the numerous expert witnesses who testified before it, 162 but it failed to take advanto a specific discovery problem, see Recent Development, Criminal Procedure-Evidence
-Composite Drawing Not Producible Under Jencks Act, 66 MICH. L. REv. 772 (1968).
156. See note 40 supra and text accompan}ing note 52 supra.
157. For recent developments in civil discovery and deposition rules, see Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 215 (1967).
158. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1150, 1192-98 (1960).
159. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT! THE COURTS 43 (1967).
160. Id.
161. For discussion of recent developments, see Ratnoff, The New Criminal Deposition Statute in Ohio-Help or Hindrance to Justice?, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 279;
(1968); Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967);

Note, Florida's Proposed Rules of Criminal DiscoveT)'-A New Chapter in Criminal
Procedure, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 68 (1966); Thode, Arraignment, Pretrial Hearing and
Discovery, Oct. 13, 1966 (mimeographed address to Institute on Texas and Federal
Criminal Procedure, University of Texas School of Law).
162. Lawrence Speiser, Director of the "\Vashington office of the American Civil
Liberties Union stressed the value of discovery in criminal, as in civil, cases. Hearings,
pt. 3, at 215.
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tage of this opportunity. There are many features requiring careful
consideration. For example, to what extent could discovery be made
reciprocal, within constitutional bounds?163 Would it be adequate
to allow depositions to be taken before any person qualified to administer oaths, or is there sufficient difference from civil cases to
require that criminal discovery take place before a judicial officer
with some authority to protect witnesses? It may well be that judicial
control of depositions is needed, since there is a real possibility that
a witness called to testify at the deposition might incriminate himself. Rather than entrust this responsibility to one of the two counsel
present, neither of whose interests may coincide with the witness', it
might be preferable to require the presence of a judicial officer possessing the authority to appoint counsel for a witness who needs it.
Similarly, there may be stronger reasons to object to the form or
content of questions in depositions in criminal cases than in civil.
Once again, having a judicial officer available to make a ruling on
the spot would serve a useful purpose. In fact, the newly created
federal magistrates might themselves be given such a task. Section
101 of the Federal Magistrates Act provides that the district court
may establish rules pursuant to which ... any full-time United States
magistrate, or . . . any part-time magistrate specially designated by
the court, may be assigned ... additional duties .... The additional
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions . . . .164

In short, the Federal Magistrates Act can serve to further rather
than to retard criminal discovery. The Supreme Court, through its
rule-making authority, or the district courts through theirs, 165 should
act to fill the potential void in discovery arising out of the Act's
preliminary hearing provisions, and advantage should be taken of
the express availability of the federal magistrates whom the Act provides to conduct pretrial discovery proceedings.
163. The problem already exists under Fm. R. CRIM. P. 16(c). See Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 482 (1968) (panel discussion before Judicial Conference
of the Second Circuit, Sept. 8, 1967). See also Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal
Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 63-64 (1963) (remarks of Justice Brennan).
Reciprocity in discovery has been widely urged. See, e.g., Washington Post, May 11,
1967, at Bl (proposal by a Maryland state's attorney to Prince George's County Bar
Association); Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1966, at B6 (remarks of Judge Leventhal to
District of Columbia Bar Association's junior section); Discovery in Criminal Cases,
44 F.R.D. 498-99 (1968) (statement by U.S. Attorney for Connecticut).
164. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969).
165. See FED. R. CRI~r. P. 57(a), which authorizes district courts to make rules
for the conduct of criminal proceedings so long as they are not inconsistent with the
statutes or rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.

